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Foreword
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his 
duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.
 – American Bar Association 
The majority of California prosecutors successfully discharge the obligations requisite in their 
two roles: acting both as advocates in seeking convictions and as ministers of justice, charged 
with using only fair methods to prosecute those they believe are guilty. But, as this report 
shows, some prosecutors have let their advocacy role prevail to the extent of using deceptive 
and unfair tactics to secure convictions.  
This study of prosecutorial misconduct was undertaken to further understand the scope of 
the problem, and is a long overdue step in trying to address the issue. In 2004, the California 
Senate established the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice (CCFAJ) 
to examine the causes of wrongful conviction and recommend reforms to improve the 
administration of justice. It was my honor to serve on that Commission and to work under 
the extraordinary leadership of its chairman, former California Attorney General John Van de 
Kamp and its executive director, Santa Clara University School of Law professor and former 
dean Gerald Uelmen. 
As a Commissioner, I was asked to assist the Commission in understanding the extent to 
which prosecutorial misconduct is a factor in the conviction of innocent people in the state. 
Until that point, very little systematic research had been done on this problem of prosecutorial 
misconduct in California or on its effects on the conviction of innocent people.  
Early on in my work, I came across a ground-breaking study published in 1999 in the Chicago 
Tribune. It was conducted by reporters Maurice Possley and Ken Armstrong, and published 
in a five-part series. The series, “Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win,” 
focused particularly on prosecutorial misconduct since the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision 
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in Brady v. Maryland. It was a terrific piece of work and I wanted to know more about it, 
so I called the Tribune and reached Possley. In our brief conversation, I told him what I was 
doing, he described their work, wished me good luck and we said goodbye. Two years later, 
in a Commission hearing in 2007, I reported my findings, which were later published in the 
CCFAJ Final Report.  
Intrigued by what I had learned from my work for CCFAJ, I continued the research to expand 
upon the findings. In 2009, in the midst of the expanded project, Possley, who had left the 
Tribune in 2008 after winning a Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting, joined me in the 
research. His work was essential to this report and I am deeply grateful to him. 
I have many others to thank. 
Thank you to Santa Clara University and in particular Santa Clara University School of Law 
Dean Donald Polden for unwavering support of this project. A million thanks go to Sarah 
Perez and Jessica Seargeant for their countless hours, intelligence, friendship, humor and 
support of every kind that they gave to us and to this project; to Jessica Marz whose critical role 
in the research and data analysis of the earlier CCFAJ study was invaluable to me; and to the 
staff of the Northern California Innocence Project, all of whom in some way have contributed 
to this work.
We are incredibly grateful for the support and friendship of the extraordinary Northern 
California Innocence Project Advisory Board, who with remarkable intellectual power and 
generosity invested hours in meetings to discuss the importance of this research and to 
strategize about how best to share our findings. I want to particularly thank Jim Anderson for 
carrying the flag for policy and reform from the beginning and Andy Ludwick who helped us 
crystallize our vision of this project - always with humor, encouragement and wise counsel. 
And, most especially, I want to thank Frank Quattrone who always encouraged excellence and 
has been supportive through the years it took to complete this project.   
I am grateful to all of our generous donors, in particular, the remarkable man and anonymous 
donor whose commitment launched us into the final stretch, to the Frank and Denise 
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Quattrone Foundation for bringing this project home, and to the law firm of Howard Rice 
Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin for the exceptional pro bono support they gave us to 
complete this project. We are especially grateful to Denise Foderaro (Quattrone), whose critical 
eye for detail and knowledge of the subject proved invaluable, and to Barbara Winters who 
brought her extraordinary editing skills to this project.  
Thanks to the many Santa Clara University Law students who assisted in this research over the 
last five years, my heroes (you know who you are), the countless people who helped us identify 
the names of the prosecutors and to the colleagues who reviewed drafts and gave us invaluable 
feedback and guidance including:  Madeline deLone, Cathy Dreyfuss, Barbara Fargo, Keith 
Findley, Brandon Garrett, Bennett Gershman, Daniel Medwed, Theresa Newman, Carol 
Sanger, Gerald Uelmen, John Van de Kamp and Ellen Yaroshefsky.
Enormous thanks go to my Associate Director Lee Raney, whose persistence and faith drove 
this project to completion, and our one-woman marketing department, Audrey Redmond, 
who managed to wrestle the pages out of our hands and out the door. 
And to Maurice Possley, who in just over a year has been transformed from a person I respected 
and whose work I admired to someone I count on every day for his professional advice, 
friendship and wit. 
Not least, Maurice and I want to thank our families for their patience and support during 
the many hours we spent away from them to bring this report to fruition. And to my partner 
Linda Starr, whose professional judgment and personal support make everything possible. 
And to the prosecutors and members of the California State Bar who have helped and 
supported us in this work. You have our gratitude and highest respect.
Cookie Ridolfi 
October 2010 
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ABOUT PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009
Preventable Error:  A Report on Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 1997–2009  is the most 
comprehensive, up-to-date, quantitative and actionable study on the extent of prosecutorial misconduct 
in California, how the justice system identifies and addresses it, and its cost and consequences, 
including the wrongful conviction of innocent people. By shining a light on prosecutorial conduct, 
this groundbreaking research, the work of leading experts in the field from the highly respected legal 
resource, NCIP, will serve as a catalyst for reform.
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aimed at ensuring the integrity of our justice system.
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Introduction and Executive Summary
Seventy-five years ago, in reversing a conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct, the 
United States Supreme Court specified the paramount obligation of a prosecutor:  “[A] 
prosecutor has a duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction1… [While he] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”2  The 
Court emphasized the critical role the prosecutor plays in a judicial system like ours that is 
aimed at justice, not simply conviction:  the prosecutor “is the representative… of a sovereignty 
whose… interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall 
be done.”3  Because the prosecutor had misstated evidence, bullied witnesses, put words into 
the mouth of a witness and intimated facts he knew were false, the Court overturned the 
conviction.  
The problem of prosecutorial misconduct is even more critical today.  Scores of academic 
articles and books, as well as the media, have documented the extent to which some 
prosecutors continue to use the very tactics the Supreme Court decried, as well as others, to 
obtain convictions.4  
To more fully document the scope of the problem, the Northern California Innocence Project 
(NCIP) engaged in a comprehensive analysis of publicly available cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct in California, reviewing more than 4,000 state and federal appellate rulings, as well 
as scores of media reports and trial court decisions, covering the period 1997 through 2009.  
This study—the “Misconduct Study”—is the most in-depth statewide review of prosecutorial 
misconduct in the United States.  
NCIP’s examination revealed 707 cases in which courts explicitly found that prosecutors 
committed misconduct.  In about 3,000 of the 4,000 cases, the courts rejected the 
prosecutorial misconduct allegations, and in another 282, the courts did not decide whether 
prosecutors’ actions were improper, finding that the trials were nonetheless fair.  
Identifying 707 cases in which prosecutorial misconduct was found—on average, about one 
case a week—undoubtedly understates the total number of such cases.  These 707 are just 
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the cases identified in review of appellate cases and a handful of others found through media 
searches and other means.  About 97 percent of felony criminal cases are resolved without trial, 
almost all through guilty pleas.5  Moreover, findings of misconduct at the trial court level that 
are not reflected in appellate opinions cannot be systematically reviewed without searching 
every case file in every courthouse in the state.  And of course, the number cannot capture 
cases of prosecutorial misconduct that were never discovered (for example, failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence) or appealed (due, for example, to lack of resources or ineffective counsel). 
The Misconduct Study’s findings as to the results in these 707 cases were as follows:  In the 
vast majority—548 of the 707 cases—courts found misconduct but nevertheless upheld the 
convictions, ruling that the misconduct was harmless—that the defendants received fair trials 
notwithstanding the prosecutor’s conduct.  Only in 159 of the 707 cases—about 20 percent—
did the courts find that the misconduct was harmful; in these cases they either set aside the 
conviction or sentence, declared a mistrial or barred evidence.  
The Misconduct Study shows that those empowered to address the problem—California state 
and federal courts, prosecutors and the California State Bar—repeatedly fail to take meaningful 
action.  Courts fail to report prosecutorial misconduct (despite having a statutory obligation to 
do so), prosecutors deny that it occurred, and the California State Bar almost never disciplines it. 
Significantly, of the 4,741 public disciplinary actions reported in the California State Bar 
Journal from January 1997 to September 2009, only 10 involved prosecutors, and only six 
of these were for conduct in the handling of a criminal case.  That means that the State Bar 
publicly disciplined only one percent of the prosecutors in the 600 cases in which the courts found 
prosecutorial misconduct and NCIP researchers identified the prosecutor.
Further, some prosecutors have committed misconduct repeatedly.  In the subset of the 
707 cases in which NCIP was able to identify the prosecutor involved (600 cases), 67 
prosecutors–11.2 percent—committed misconduct in more than one case.  Three prosecutors 
committed misconduct in four cases, and two did so in five.
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The failure of judges, prosecutors and the California State Bar to live up to their responsibilities 
to report, monitor and discipline prosecutorial misconduct fosters misconduct, undercuts 
public trust and casts a cloud over those prosecutors who do their jobs properly.  The problem 
is critical. 
Prosecutorial misconduct is an important issue for us as a society, regardless of the guilt 
or innocence of the criminal defendants involved in the individual cases.  Prosecutorial 
misconduct fundamentally perverts the course of justice and costs taxpayers millions of dollars 
in protracted litigation.  It undermines our trust in the reliability of the justice system and 
subverts the notion that we are a fair society.  
At its worst, the guilty go free and the innocent are 
convicted.  An especially stark example is the death 
penalty prosecution of Mark Sodersten, a man who 
spent 22 years behind bars convicted of a murder 
that the appellate court said he most likely did not 
commit.
In 2007, a California Court of Appeal found that 
the deputy district attorney who prosecuted Sodersten, Phillip Cline, had improperly withheld 
from the defense audiotapes of his interviews with a key witness.6  After reviewing the tapes, 
the justices found they contained dramatic evidence pointing to Sodersten’s innocence.  Based 
on this finding, the court vacated his conviction, emphasizing:  “This case raises the one issue 
that is the most feared aspect of our system—that an innocent man might be convicted.”7  
For Sodersten, the ruling in his case came too late:  he had died in prison six months earlier.  
Even though the defendant’s death ordinarily ends the case, the court took the unusual step of 
issuing a ruling anyway because of the importance of the issue:  
“[W]hat happened in this case has such an impact upon the integrity and fairness that 
are the cornerstones of our criminal justice system that continued public confidence 
in that system requires us to address the validity of [Sodersten’s] conviction despite the 
fact we can no longer provide a remedy for petitioner himself.”8   
Prosecutorial misconduct 
is an important issue for us 
as a society, regardless of 
the guilt or innocence of the 
criminal defendants involved 
in the individual cases. 
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The court concluded:
“To do otherwise would be a disservice to the legitimate public expectation that judges 
will enforce justice.  It would be a disservice to justice.  Most of all, it would be a disservice 
to [Sodersten] who maintained his innocence despite a system that failed him.”9
The prosecutor was never disciplined.  Sodersten’s attorney filed a formal complaint with 
the California State Bar, arguing that the prosecutor “asked a jury to kill a man based on a 
conviction he perverted.”10  But in April 2010, the State Bar closed the investigation, because 
“this office has concluded that we could not prove culpability by clear and convincing 
evidence”—even though the tapes the prosecutor wrongfully withheld included interviews 
with a key witness conducted by the prosecutor himself.11  
The prosecutor, Phillip Cline, has never been held responsible for his actions, and it is virtually 
certain that he never will.  He has absolute immunity from any civil liability for his conduct as 
a prosecutor.  Cline was elected District Attorney for Tulare County in 1992 and remains in 
that position today.  
In short, as the Misconduct Study 
concludes, prosecutors continue to engage 
in misconduct, sometimes multiple times, 
almost always without consequence.  And 
the courts’ reluctance to report prosecutorial 
misconduct and the State Bar’s failure 
to discipline it empowers prosecutors to 
continue to commit misconduct.  While 
the majority of California prosecutors do 
their jobs with integrity, the findings of 
the Misconduct Study demonstrate that 
the scope and persistence of the problem is 
alarming.  Reform is critical. 
The failure of judges, prosecutors 
and the California State Bar to 
live up to their responsibilities 
to report, monitor and discipline 
prosecutorial misconduct fosters 
misconduct, undercuts public 
trust and casts a cloud over those 
prosecutors who do their jobs 
properly. The problem is critical. 
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The authors recommend a number of reforms as first steps toward the goal of eliminating 
attorney misconduct in criminal cases, including:  
 ■ Court-related reforms, such as expanding the existing judicial reporting requirement to 
mandate reporting of any finding of egregious prosecutorial misconduct, as well as any 
constitutional violation, even if deemed harmless; identifying in opinions the full names of 
prosecutors found to have committed misconduct; California Supreme Court monitoring 
of compliance with judicial reporting and notice obligations and making public the 
records of compliance; and replacing prosecutors’ current absolute immunity from civil 
liability with a form of qualified immunity; 
 ■ Remedies for the California State Bar, such as adopting revised ethical rules concerning 
special responsibilities of prosecutors (modeled on the American Bar Association’s 
Model Rule 3.8)12, expanding discipline for prosecutorial misconduct and increasing the 
transparency of the State Bar disciplinary process; and
 ■ Attorney-related reforms, such as ethical training for prosecutors and criminal defense 
attorneys, establishing internal misconduct procedures and developing exculpatory 
evidence policies.  
Prosecutorial misconduct is wrong.  It is not excusable as a means to convict the guilty, and it 
is abhorrent in the conviction of the innocent.  It has no place in a criminal justice system that 
strives to be fair, to accurately convict the guilty and to protect the innocent.  It undercuts the 
public trust and impugns the reputations of the majority of prosecutors, who uphold the law 
and live up to their obligation to seek justice.
By casting a blind eye to prosecutors who place their thumbs on the scale of justice, judges, 
prosecutors and the California State Bar are failing to live up to their responsibilities, fostering 
misconduct and opening the door to the inevitable—the conviction of the innocent and the 
release of the guilty.  It is time to acknowledge the problem and take needed action.
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Organizational Summary
The organizational structure of this report is as follows:  it describes the methodology the 
Misconduct Study employed (Part I); provides an overview of the Study’s findings (Part 
II); reviews the cases finding misconduct and those declining to decide the issue (Part III); 
discusses the role of the prosecutors (Part IV), the courts (Part V) and the California State 
Bar (Part VI) in addressing prosecutorial misconduct; examines the costs and consequences 
of prosecutorial misconduct (Part VII); shows how absolute immunity allows prosecutors to 
escape accountability (Part VIII) and makes recommendations for dealing with the problem 
(Part IX).
Recommendations
The California State Bar, in conjunction with the California District Attorneys 
Association, California Public Defenders Association and California Attorneys for 
Criminal Justice, should develop a course specifically designed to address ethical 
issues that commonly arise in criminal cases.
District Attorney offices should adopt internal policies that do not tolerate 
misconduct, including establishing internal reviews of error.
District Attorney offices and law enforcement agencies should adopt written 
administrative exculpatory evidence policies to govern Brady compliance.
The reporting statute should be expanded to require judicial reporting of any 
finding of “egregious” misconduct as defined by the California Commission on the 
Fair Administration of Justice (CCFAJ), as well as any constitutional violation by a 
prosecutor or defense attorney, regardless of whether it resulted in modification or 
reversal of the judgment, including violations of ethical rules.
Judges should be required to list attorneys’ full names in opinions finding 
misconduct. (continued)
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Recommendations (continued)
The California Supreme Court should actively monitor compliance with the 
requirements of judicial reporting and notification of attorneys mandated by 
Business and Professions Code section 6086.7. Records of compliance—a list of 
cases reported to the State Bar by the court—should be publicly available.
Prosecutors should be entitled at best to qualified immunity.
California should adopt American Bar Association’s Model Rule 3.8.
The State Bar should expand discipline for prosecutorial misconduct and increase 
disciplinary transparency.
I.  
Methodology
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I. Methodology
The goals of the Misconduct Study were to identify:  (1) federal and state court findings of 
prosecutorial misconduct in criminal cases in California during the period 1997 through 
2009; (2) consequences of that misconduct for the outcome of the cases; and (3) disciplinary 
consequences for the prosecutors themselves.  The Misconduct Study expands upon and 
further analyzes the issues addressed in a report issued in 2008 by the California Commission 
on the Fair Administration of Justice (CCFAJ) on prosecutorial misconduct,13 which covered 
the period 1997 through 2006.  
For the first goal, the NCIP sought to identify the state and federal criminal cases in California 
during this period in which issues of prosecutorial misconduct were raised.  Primarily through 
online legal database searches using Westlaw, NCIP researchers identified approximately 4,000 
such state and federal appellate rulings that raised the issue.  
From a review of these rulings, researchers segregated out those cases in which the court 
explicitly found no prosecutorial misconduct (approximately 3,000 of the cases) and those in 
which the court explicitly declined to address the issue (282 cases).  
The result was identification of 707 cases in which the courts made specific findings of 
misconduct.  Included in this number were not only the cases identified through online 
research, but also a small number of cases (approximately three percent) identified by 
examining scores of media reports and trial court decisions, including through the NEXIS 
online media database, and by following leads generated by Westlaw database searches and 
interviews with attorneys.  
This number certainly understates the number of cases in which prosecutorial misconduct 
was found.  The 707 cases were primarily ones reviewed by appellate courts and accordingly 
reflected in a trial court transcript.  The overwhelming majority of cases are never subjected 
to judicial review.  More than 97 percent of felony criminal cases are resolved without trial, 
almost all through guilty pleas.14  Some cases of misconduct are never appealed.  Further, 
during the first five years covered in the Misconduct Study, more than 90 percent of California 
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State appellate decisions were not entered into legal databases.15  As a result, these rulings, as 
well as findings of misconduct at the trial court level and not reflected in appellate opinions, 
cannot be systematically reviewed without personally searching every courthouse archive in  
the state. 
How a Criminal Appeal is Processed:  This chart demonstrates the process for appealing a criminal conviction in California. Most of the 
opinions reviewed by NCIP occurred at the Court of Appeal level. 
Source: Self Service Center, Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, available at http://www.scselfservice.org/home/overview.htm
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To determine the effect of the courts’ findings of prosecutorial misconduct for these 707 
criminal cases—the second goal—the results in each case were compiled.  In nearly 80 percent 
of those cases, the courts nevertheless upheld the convictions (harmless error).  In only about 
20 percent of these cases did the finding result in setting aside of the conviction or sentence, 
mistrial, or barred evidence (harmful error).  
Percentage of Cases that Go to Trial: Ninety-seven percent of criminal cases in California do not go to trial. This chart details what 
happens to them. 
Source: Judicial Council of California and California Legislative Analysis Office
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The harmful error category is defined as cases where misconduct was found and where the 
finding resulted in courts setting aside convictions or sentences, declaring mistrials or barring 
evidence. The harmless error category is defined as cases where misconduct was found, but 
the courts nevertheless upheld the convictions, ruling that the misconduct did not alter the 
fundamental fairness of the trial.  After reviewing the cases, NCIP researchers developed a 
third category where the court refrained from making a ruling on the prosecutorial misconduct 
issues, instead holding that any error would have been harmless or that the issue was waived 
because the defense failed to make a proper objection.
To address the third goal of identifying disciplinary consequences for the prosecutors found 
to have committed misconduct in these cases, NCIP researchers first confronted the hurdle of 
trying to identify those prosecutors by name, since reviewing courts rarely do so.  Researchers so 
far have identified the prosecutors in 600 of the 707 misconduct cases, through examination of 
court dockets, and by making personal inquiries of prosecutors’ and public defenders’ offices, as 
well as other court personnel.  Efforts to identify the remaining prosecutors are ongoing. 
NCIP researchers then attempted to determine whether the identified prosecutors were 
referenced in any California State Bar disciplinary reports, as well as, more generally, to identify 
reports of any other cases of State Bar discipline for prosecutorial misconduct.  To do this, 
researchers reviewed the reports of all disciplinary decisions published by the California State 
Bar in the State Bar Journal during this period.16  Because the State Bar does not make these 
decisions available for online searching, the published reports of every case—4,714 disciplinary 
records—were reviewed.  The results were that only ten public disciplinary reports in this 
nearly 13-year period (1997-September 2009) involved prosecutors—all of these since 2005—
and only six of those were for conduct arising in the handling of a criminal case.  Also, in the 
subset of the 707 cases in which NCIP was able to identify the prosecutor involved (600 cases), 
it found that 67 prosecutors committed misconduct more than once, including three who 
committed misconduct four times and two who did so five times.  
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II.  
Overview  
of  
Findings 
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II. Overview of Findings
The Misconduct Study identified cases alleging prosecutorial misconduct in California between 
1997 and 2009. This is a summary of the findings:
 ■ 67 of the 600 identified prosecutors in the 707 cases where misconduct was found 
committed misconduct more than once, three committed misconduct four times and two 
did so five times.
 ■ Only six of the prosecutors in the 707 cases where misconduct was found were disciplined 
by the California State Bar:  From January 1997 to September 2009, only ten of the 
4,741 public disciplinary actions reported in the California State Bar Journal involved 
prosecutors, and only six of those, all occurring since 2005, were for conduct arising in the 
handling of a criminal case.
 ■ In 707 cases, courts explicitly found that prosecutors committed misconduct.
 ■ In 159 of the 707 cases where misconduct was found, the finding resulted in the setting 
aside of the conviction or sentence, mistrial, or barred evidence.
 ■ In 548 of the 707 cases where misconduct was found, the courts nevertheless upheld the 
convictions, ruling that the misconduct did not alter the fundamental fairness of the trial.
 ■ In 282 cases, the court refrained from making a ruling on the prosecutorial misconduct 
issue, instead holding that any error would have been harmless or that the issue was 
waived. 
 ■ In about 3,000 of the approximately 4,000 cases identified, the courts explicitly found no 
prosecutorial misconduct.
 ■ There were approximately 4,000 federal and state criminal cases in California in which the 
issue of prosecutorial misconduct was raised. 
III.  
Analysis  
of Cases  
Alleging  
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
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III. Analysis of Cases Alleging Prosecutorial Misconduct
As noted, NCIP research identified about 4,000 cases involving allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  In approximately three-quarters of these, the court rejected these allegations; 
those cases are not discussed in the Misconduct Study.  Of the remaining cases, the court 
found that there was prosecutorial misconduct in 707 of them (Part A below), and declined to 
reach the issue in 282 cases (Part B below).
A. Cases Finding Prosecutorial Misconduct
“To submit this case to the jury would make a mockery of Mr. Ruehle’s constitutional 
right to… a fair trial… The government’s misconduct has compromised the integrity 
and legitimacy of the case.”
– United States v. Ruehle, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 17
In December 2009, the federal district court dismissed the charges against Broadcom 
Corporation’s former chief financial officer, William Ruehle, and company co-founder Henry 
T. Nicholas III, on the grounds that the prosecutor, Andrew Stolper, intimidated witnesses.  
The intimidation included telephoning the current employer of a former Broadcom employee 
who had initially refused to cooperate with the prosecution, resulting in her being fired. The 
court overturned that former employee’s guilty plea.18  The court also overturned the guilty plea 
of another Broadcom employee because the prosecutor coerced him to become a prosecution 
witness by inducing him to admit to a crime he did not commit.  Judge Cormac Carney called 
prosecutor Stolper’s conduct “shameful.”19
The ruling of harmful error in Ruehle is in the minority.  Of the 707 cases in which there were 
findings of prosecutorial misconduct, convictions were upheld in nearly 80 percent of the 
cases—548 of the 707—despite the finding of prosecutorial misconduct.  In only 159 cases 
was the prosecutorial misconduct deemed sufficiently egregious in the context of the overall 
trial for the courts to find harmful error and set aside convictions or sentences, declare mistrials 
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or bar evidence.  This is a result of the appellate courts’ liberal application of the “harmless 
error” doctrine employed in appellate review of misconduct.
1.  Defining Misconduct: Background on the Harmless Error Doctrine
Applying the harmless error doctrine, an appellate court may affirm a conviction even where 
prosecutorial misconduct or other errors occurred, if it believes that the error did not affect 
the outcome of the case.20  Only 20 percent of the prosecutorial misconduct cases were able 
to surmount this high hurdle.  While this doctrine was originally intended to eliminate the 
need for multiple retrials for small technical mistakes, it has evolved to the point that it is now 
applied even to constitutional violations. 
The United States Supreme Court enunciated the federal standard in the landmark case of 
Chapman v. California, holding that “there may be some constitutional errors which in the 
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with 
the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the 
conviction.”21 
In California, the harmless error rule is rooted in the California Constitution, which provides 
that judgments shall not be set aside 
or new trials granted on specified 
grounds “unless, after an examination 
of the entire cause, including the 
evidence, the court shall be of the 
opinion that the error complained 
of has resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice.”22  The California Supreme 
Court has held that a “miscarriage 
of justice” requires a finding “that it 
is reasonably probable that a result 
more favorable to the appealing 
party would have been reached in the 
absence of the error.”23
Breakdown of Misconduct Findings: Of the 707 cases finding misconduct in 
this study, courts ruled 78 percent harmless and 22 percent harmful. Harmful 
findings are cases where courts set aside convictions or sentences, declared 
mistrials or barred evidence. Harmless findings are cases where the conviction 
was upheld despite the misconduct. 
Harmful
22%
Harmless
78%
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2. Harmful Error: Where Misconduct Resulted in Setting Aside Convictions or 
Sentence, Mistrials, or Barring of Evidence
Harmful error often involves “grossly shocking”24 prosecutorial misconduct, as in the cases of 
William Ruehle and Augustin Uribe.  The Court of Appeal set aside Uribe’s conviction for child 
molestation in 2008 because Santa Clara County deputy district attorney Troy Benson withheld 
critical evidence from the defense:  a videotape of the victim’s medical exam that supported 
the defense expert’s testimony that no sexual assault had occurred.25  On remand, the judge 
dismissed the case; the dismissal is now on appeal.26  The discovery of the videotape in the Uribe 
case led to more than 3,000 other videotapes dating back to 1991 that had never been disclosed 
to defense attorneys.27  
Uribe’s case is one of the 159 in which courts found that the prosecutorial misconduct 
constituted harmful error and set aside convictions or sentences, declared mistrials or barred 
evidence.
Distribution of Harmful Case Findings by Court: The cases reviewed in this study where convictions or sentences were set aside, 
mistrial declared, and evidence barred fell into the above distribution. The misconduct findings came out of the California Appellate Courts 
in about half the cases. The other half were distributed throughout the other courts. 
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3.  Harmless Error:  Where The Courts Affirmed Convictions or Rejected Trial 
Challenges Despite Prosecutorial Misconduct 
“We find the prosecutor engaged in a troubling and extensive pattern of misconduct…  
[D]espite the gravity of the misconduct, we are convinced it did not affect the verdict… 
In another case… it might well require reversal.”
– People v. McKenzie, First District Court of Appeal 28 
The McKenzie case is a prime example of how the harmless error standard has been applied to 
affirm convictions even in the face of explicit findings of prosecutorial misconduct.  The court 
criticized Alameda County deputy district attorney Brian Owens for engaging in repeated 
misconduct, stating, “The only conclusion we can draw from [the prosecutor’s] dogged 
pursuit of this line of questioning is an intent to insinuate the existence of evidence he could 
not properly bring before the jury.”29  It 
compared this conduct to a prosecutor 
who “instilled a poison which the defense 
could not drain from the case.”30  Yet the 
court went on to affirm the conviction, 
relying on the harmless error doctrine 
to rule that despite the misconduct, the 
defendant received a fair trial.  The same 
result occurred in nearly 80 percent of the 
prosecutorial misconduct cases identified 
in the Misconduct Study: convictions 
were upheld based on the “harmless error” 
doctrine.  
Liberal application of the harmless error rule is problematic in critical respects, for which the 
Misconduct Study’s authors offer specific recommendations (see Part IX).  Specifically, it has led 
courts repeatedly to affirm convictions despite findings of prosecutorial misconduct, as in 548 
of the 707 cases identified in the Misconduct Study.  
The egregiousness of a 
prosecutor’s misconduct does 
not determine the harmfulness of 
the error; the issue for harmless 
error review is whether despite 
the misconduct, the defendant 
received a fair trial.  That means 
that very serious misconduct can 
be deemed harmless.   
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It also increases even further the likelihood that prosecutors will commit misconduct with 
impunity.  As noted, there were only six cases of public discipline for prosecutorial misconduct 
in a nearly 13-year period, and none for misconduct in a case where the error was found to be 
harmless.  
In fact, there is not even a requirement to report misconduct found to be harmless.  As is 
discussed in more detail below (see Part V), California Business and Professional Code section 
6086.7 requires only that courts report misconduct whenever there is a reversal or modification 
in a judgment as a result of attorney misconduct.  That is true even though the misconduct 
in harmless error cases can be just as egregious as that in cases where the error is found to be 
harmful, since the result depends on an analysis of the overall trial.  
Harmful Error Conduct Harmless Error Conduct
Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149 (2006)
Shifting the Burden of Proof
“That presumption [of innocence], when you go 
back in the room behind you, is going to vanish 
when you start deliberating. And that’s when the 
presumption of guilt is going to take over…”  
(at 1169)
Flores-Perez, 311 Fed.Appx 69 (2009)
Shifting the Burden of Proof
“when you retire to the jury room to deliberate, 
the presumption [of innocence]  
is gone. You are no longer obligated to presume 
innocence, but you are obligated to draw rational 
conclusions from the evidence.” (at 71)
Combs, 379 F.3d 564 (2004)
Improper Examination
“compel Combs to impugn the veracity of agent 
Bailey’s testimony, pitting Comb’s credibility 
against agent Bailey’s.” (at 573)
Brown, 2006 WL 1062095 (2006)
Improper Examination
“forcing [defendant] to characterize all the 
witnesses, including police officers as liars.” (at 
22)
Sandoval, 231 F.3d 1140 (2000)
Appeal to Religious Authority
“prosecutor argued to the jury that the death 
penalty was sanctioned by God.” He paraphrased 
Romans 13 saying, “But if you do what is evil, be 
afraid for it does not bear the sword for nothing 
for it is a minister of God an avenger who brings 
wrath upon one who practices evil.” (at 1150)
Welch, 20 Cal.4th 701 (1999)
Appeal to Religious Authority
“prosecutor read various passages of the Bible 
apparently sanctioning capital punishment, 
including Exodus, chapter 21, verse 12, which 
states, ‘He that smiteth a man, so that he die, 
shall be surely put to death’.”(at 761)
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In short, the egregiousness of a prosecutor’s misconduct does not determine the harmfulness of 
the error; the issue for harmless error review is whether despite the misconduct, the defendant 
received a fair trial.  That means that very serious misconduct can be deemed harmless.  
Thus, the prosecutorial misconduct in the 548 harmless error cases may have involved 
infractions just as serious as—in some cases, identical to—those in the 159 harmful error cases. 
Yet in the harmless error cases, the courts have no obligation to report misconduct to the State 
Bar or notify the prosecutor of the misconduct finding.31  Accordingly, prosecutors are not 
held accountable in the vast majority of misconduct cases.  In fact, even where the opinion 
is published, they are rarely identified by name.  In some cases, they may have no idea that a 
court ruled they committed misconduct; the courts have no obligation to notify prosecutors in 
cases where the error is deemed harmless.32  
Harmful Error Conduct Harmless Error Conduct
R. Guzman, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 (2000)
Improper Comment on Right to Silence
The prosecutor “repeatedly emphasized Hall’s (the 
other party in the incident) decision to testify… 
[and] rather clumsily alerted the jury to the fact 
that, unlike Hall, Guzman was not willing to 
explain his side of the story in court.” (at 90)
G. Guzman, 2005 WL 435452 (2005)
Improper Comment on Right to Silence
The prosecutor argued that “the prosecution 
on this case has provided to you two out of the 
three murderers who come in here and tell you 
themselves from their own mouths what really 
happened” which “brought Guzman’s failure to 
testify into sharper focus than might otherwise 
have been the case.” (at 19)
Rodrigues, 159 F.3d 439 (1998)
Impugning Defense
The prosecutor argued, “Mr. Neal [defense 
counsel] has tried to deceive you from the start 
in this case about what this case is really about…. 
[Mr. Neal] has tried to introduce a number of 
nonissues, false issues.” (at 449)
Jordan, 2005 WL 1766387 (2005)
Impugning Defense
The prosecutor argued, “What has gone on in this 
case is a mockery of the system. You’ve seen from 
start to finish the defense pull all sorts of games 
and all sorts of tricks.” (at 13)
Comparing How Courts Characterize Misconduct: Courts have found the same types of misconduct in both cases where convictions 
or sentences were set aside, mistrials declared, or evidence barred and cases where convictions were upheld. The misconduct does not 
determine whether a trial is called fair by a court. 
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Not surprisingly, some go on to repeat the exact same misconduct in other cases.  For example, 
of 67 prosecutors identified in the Misconduct Study as having committed misconduct in 
multiple cases (some as many as five times), in the vast majority of cases the misconduct was 
held to be harmless error.  These prosecutors committed repeated misconduct without ever 
being called to answer for it.  
4.  Findings of Prosecutorial Misconduct Categorized by Type  
The term “prosecutorial misconduct” encompasses a wide range of improper tactics in criminal 
cases.  The California Supreme Court has explained that it “implies a deceptive or reprehensible 
method of persuading the court or jury.”33  More broadly, the term has been used to describe 
any “behavior that deliberately seeks an unfair advantage over the accused or a third person, or 
otherwise seeks to prejudice these persons’ rights.”34  Black’s Law Dictionary provides specific 
examples, defining “prosecutorial misconduct” as “[a] prosecutor’s improper or illegal act (or 
failure to act), esp. involving an attempt to avoid required disclosure or persuade the jury to 
wrongly convict a defendant.”35
The broad scope of the concept “prosecutorial misconduct” emerges upon analysis of its specific 
types.  To that end, NCIP researchers reviewed each of the 707 cases in which prosecutorial 
misconduct was found and grouped the offending conduct—whether it was held to be harmful 
or harmless—together into specific categories.  
The majority of the eight types of misconduct findings fall into two types:  improper witness 
examination and improper argument.  Witness examination—prosecutors’ direct questioning 
of their own witnesses or challenging of defense witnesses through cross-examination—is 
improper when it misleads the jury or unfairly prejudices the defendant.  NCIP found 164 
findings of improper examination misconduct. 
As for misconduct in argument, there are a multitude of ways in which prosecutors use 
improper methods in opening or closing arguments to try to persuade the jury to convict 
the defendant.  Although courts give prosecutors wide latitude during argument, there are 
limitations; prosecutors who exceed them commit misconduct.  NCIP found 444 improper 
argument findings.
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The specific categories, discussed in more detail below, are:  eliciting inadmissible evidence in 
witness examination; vouching for a witness’s truthfulness; testifying for an absent witness; 
misstating the law; arguing facts not in evidence; mischaracterizing evidence; shifting the 
burden of proof; impugning the defense; arguing inconsistent theories of prosecution; appealing 
to religious authority; offering personal opinion; engaging in discriminatory jury selection; 
intimidating a witness; violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to silence; presenting 
false evidence; and failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.  These categories do not purport 
to exhaust all the ways in which prosecutors can commit misconduct; they are simply types of 
misconduct California courts identified during the period reviewed in the Misconduct Study.   
Courts sometimes found prosecutors committed multiple acts of different types of misconduct 
in a single case.  In totaling the number of cases that involved each type, each act that was 
found to be misconduct was counted separately.  Since some cases involved multiple acts of 
misconduct, the total number of misconduct findings is greater than the total number of 
misconduct cases identified by NCIP researchers. There were 782 total findings of misconduct 
in the 707 cases in the Misconduct Study. 
All Types of Misconduct Findings: This study found 782 separate findings of misconduct in the 707 misconduct cases. NCIP researchers 
grouped these 782 findings into the types listed above. * Improper Argument includes vouching for a witness’s truthfulness, testifying 
for an absent witness, misstating the law, arguing facts not in evidence, mischaracterizing evidence, impugning the defense, arguing 
inconsistent theories of prosecution, appealing to religious authority, offering personal opinion and shifting the burden of proof.
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Improper Witness Examination: Eliciting Inadmissible Evidence
The most common form of improper witness examination is eliciting inadmissible evidence.  
It is misconduct for prosecutors to elicit inadmissible evidence in witness examinations, and 
especially improper when the examination violates a specific court order.  It is standard practice 
for judges to make rulings before or during trial on the admissibility of evidence.  Enforcement 
of such orders is critical to protect the rights of defendants and ensure that convictions are 
based only on reliable and relevant evidence.  
Prosecutors are required to instruct their witnesses not to testify about evidence excluded 
by court order.  On cross-examination, prosecutors are prohibited from asking questions 
reasonably likely to result in answers containing prohibited information.  While questioning 
resulting in the introduction of inadmissible evidence can be unintentional, this is often not 
the case. NCIP researchers found six prosecutors who committed this type of misconduct more 
than once.  This conduct results in irreparable harm; the jury cannot “un-hear” the evidence 
once it is out. 
Example:  Harmless Misconduct
In the prosecution of Vincent Gatewood, the Court of Appeal found that in three 
different instances, Orange County deputy district attorney Janice Chieffo continued 
a line of questioning the trial court had ruled improper:  “Not only did the prosecutor 
demonstrate disrespect for the authority of the court, she also attempted to persuade 
the jury by impermissible means.”36 
Prosecutors can also improperly elicit evidence that, while not specifically excluded by court order, 
is generally not allowed in criminal trials. A common example is attempting to use a defendant’s 
past criminal history to establish his/her guilt of the crime for which he/she is on trial.37  
Example:  Harmful Misconduct
The Court of Appeal reversed the conviction of Arthur Lee for dangerous discharge of 
a firearm on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct. 38  The trial judge had instructed 
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the prosecutor, Los Angeles County deputy district attorney Lea D’Agostino, that 
in cross-examining the defendant about his prior arson conviction, she could only 
mention the name of the offense and could not ask further questions about the crime.  
The prosecutor violated this order during the defendant’s cross-examination by asking 
questions about the details of the arson and the alleged motive, and whether the 
defendant had attempted arson before.  The Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, 
holding that the arson evidence had nothing to do with the firearm charge and probably 
biased the jury against the defendant. 
Improper Argument: Vouching for a Witness’s Truthfulness  
“[T]he prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the [weight] of the Government and may induce the 
jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.”39  Because 
of the probability that a prosecutor will unduly influence the jury in evaluating witness’ 
credibility, it is improper for prosecutors to vouch for the truthfulness of a witness. 
Example:  Harmless Misconduct  
The Court of Appeal found that in the 2002 prosecution of Daniel Parra for receiving 
stolen property, San Bernadino County deputy district attorney Carolyn Youngberg 
committed misconduct by stating, during closing arguments, “I submit to you that 
both [prosecution witnesses] are extremely credible and very honest.”40  The court 
found that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to “put the backing of the government 
behind the witnesses’ honesty.”41 
Improper Argument: Testifying for An Absent Witnesses
Prosecutors must restrict their arguments to reasonable conclusions drawn solely from the 
evidence presented during trial; they cannot imply that they have other evidence of guilt that 
for reasons they cannot explain they are unable to present to the jury.  When a prosecutor 
improperly tells the jury what a witness would have said, it denies the defendant the critical 
right to confront and cross-examine that witness,42 leaving the jury simply to believe the 
prosecutor’s version of what the testimony would have been. 
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Example:  Harmful Misconduct  
The Court of Appeal reversed the conviction of Kenneth Hall for possession of cocaine 
based on this type of prosecutorial misconduct.43  During closing argument, Los Angeles 
County deputy district attorney Joseph Musso told the jury that the second police 
officer present at Hall’s arrest did not testify because he would have simply supported 
the prosecution’s version of the facts testified to by the officer who did testify.  The 
prosecutor thereby deprived the defendant of his right to cross-examine the second 
officer and impeach his credibility with the jury.
Improper Argument: Misstating the Law 
Rule 5-200 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an attorney from 
seeking to mislead the jury by a false statement of law.44  When prosecutors, bolstered by their 
authority, misstate the law, the result may be juror confusion or worse, a miscarriage of justice.  
Example:  Harmless Misconduct  
The Court of Appeal found that it was misconduct for Santa Clara County deputy 
district attorney Ted Kajani, in his closing arguments at the murder trial of Leonard 
Thompson, to repeatedly misstate the law regarding manslaughter.45  
Improper Argument: Arguing Facts Not in Evidence
A jury must decide a criminal case based solely on the evidence presented at trial;  jurors are 
prohibited from relying on or seeking outside knowledge.  When prosecutors argue facts 
unsupported by evidence, they commit misconduct.
Example:  Harmful Misconduct  
In 2004, the Court of Appeal overturned Damien Humphrey’s first degree murder 
conviction because Los Angeles County deputy district attorney Vivian Moreno 
impermissibly suggested to the jury that she had additional evidence of Humphrey’s 
guilt.46  During her opening argument, Moreno continually described the defendant as 
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having jumped out of a van, wearing a mask and holding a gun; no evidence was ever 
presented showing any of these facts.  
Improper Argument:  Mischaracterizing Evidence
Prosecutors’ characterization of the evidence and what it purportedly shows can be 
extremely powerful in persuading a jury, especially in closing arguments. When prosecutors 
mischaracterize the evidence, they mislead the jury, unfairly prejudice the defendant and 
commit misconduct. 
Example:  Harmful Misconduct 
The Court of Appeal reversed the grand theft conviction of Curley Barrett on the grounds 
of prosecutorial mischaracterization of the evidence, although the mischaracterization 
may have been inadvertent.47  Los Angeles County deputy district attorney John Evans 
argued Barrett testified that he had snuck the allegedly stolen disc in his briefcase before 
he left for the day, implying knowledge of theft.  In fact, Barrett had testified that he 
had stuck the disc in his briefcase.  The court held that even if the mischaracterization 
was inadvertent, it still harmed the defendant’s rights and required reversal.  
Improper Argument:  Impugning the Defense
It is misconduct for a prosecutor to make irrelevant, insulting comments about the defendant 
or his lawyer or to argue that the defense is fabricated.  Such arguments can prejudice the jury 
against the defense for reasons having nothing to do with the strength of the proof of guilt.48  
Such attacks undermine both the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of 
proof by implying that the prosecutor personally knows that the defendant is guilty.  
Example:  Harmful Misconduct 
In 1998, the Court of Appeal reversed Guillermo Contreras’ murder conviction and 
life sentence, based on prosecutorial misconduct.49  Los Angeles County deputy 
district attorney Jessica Goulden had argued that the defense attorney was unethical 
and dishonest and had allowed her witnesses to lie under oath.  She also compared the 
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defendant to Hitler, saying, “Hitler did a lot of evil, but he was nice to children and 
animals.  So if Hitler was on trial, [defense counsel] would be bringing in witnesses to 
say how nice he was to children all the time.”50  
Improper Argument: Arguing Inconsistent Theories of Prosecution  
It is blatant prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to argue irreconcilable theories to obtain 
convictions against two or more criminal defendants.  For example, a prosecutor is prohibited 
from arguing in two separate trials, in connection with a crime in which he contends there 
was a single assailant, that each of the two defendants was that single assailant.  Because 
a prosecutor’s duty is to seek the truth, rather than simply to obtain convictions, arguing 
inconsistent theories undermines the reliability of both convictions, as well as the integrity of 
the criminal justice system, and creates the real likelihood of convicting one or more innocent 
individuals.  Beyond the constitutional principles of fundamental fairness and reliability 
ensured by the due process clause, a prosecutor’s knowing use of inconsistent arguments raises 
serious ethical considerations.
Example:  Harmful Misconduct
In 2005, the California Supreme Court set aside the death sentence imposed on Peter 
Sakarias on the grounds that Los Angeles County deputy district attorney Steven Ipsen 
deliberately manipulated evidence in aid of conflicting theories to convict Sakarias 
and co-defendant Tauno Waidla in separate trials.51  In Waidla’s trial, Ipsen argued 
that Waidla struck the fatal blow and presented supporting medical evidence.  Then, 
in Sakarias’ trial, Ipsen omitted a portion of the medical testimony and argued that 
Sakarias struck the fatal blow.
Improper Argument: Appealing to Religious Authority
It is misconduct for the prosecutor to invoke religious authority.  This issue generally arises in 
connection with punishment in the penalty phase of a capital case, where some prosecutors 
have argued that the Bible requires the death penalty or that God’s will must be carried out 
by the death penalty’s application.  Such arguments interfere with a jury’s responsibility to 
administer state and federal law, and allow a prosecutor to substitute personal religious beliefs 
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in a manner inimical to the constitutional separation of church and state.  California courts 
have found that prosecution reliance on religious authority in support of the death penalty 
“tends to diminish the jury’s sense of responsibility for its verdict and to imply than another, 
higher law should be applied.”52    
Example: Harmful Misconduct
In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside the death sentence 
of Arthur Sandoval based on the prosecutor’s improper reliance on religious authority 
to argue for the death penalty.53  Los Angeles County deputy district attorney David 
Milton paraphrased quotations from the Bible saying that God’s avengers should bring 
wrath upon those who commit evil; and said:  “You are not playing God.  You are doing 
what God says.  This might be the only opportunity to wake [the defendant] up.  God 
will destroy the body to save the soul.”54 
Improper Argument: Offering Personal Opinion 
Because prosecutors are representatives of the people of the state of California, prosecutors’ 
statements have inherently greater authority than those of other attorneys or witnesses.  For 
this reason, a prosecutor may not “express a personal opinion or belief in a defendant’s guilt, 
where there is substantial danger that jurors will interpret this as being based on information at 
the prosecutor’s command, other than evidence adduced at trial.”55  Despite this unequivocal 
rule, a number of the cases of prosecutorial misconduct in the Misconduct Study involved such 
expression of opinion.
Example:  Harmless Misconduct
In the 2000 conviction of Jackie Woods, the prosecutor stated during closing arguments 
“we do not prosecute anybody whom we personally do not believe to be guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”56 The prosecutor also stated everybody in the District Attorney’s 
office lives by this standard. The court affirmed the conviction finding that the jury could 
have believed this was a comment on the evidence rather than his personal opinion of 
Woods’ guilt.
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Improper Argument: Shifting the Burden of Proof
Prosecutorial misconduct concerning the burden of proof required for conviction is an especially 
serious violation.  Given the greater power, resources and authority of the state, as represented by 
the prosecutor’s office, the presumption of innocence is the crucial safeguard against that power 
and a protection of a person’s liberty.  That is because, in the cold reality of a typical courtroom 
on the first day of a jury trial, it is very difficult to really regard the “accused” as innocent.  He 
has been brought to trial because the police and prosecutors—respected representatives of the 
authority of the state—believe he is guilty; that alone is difficult to surmount.
The presumption of innocence is designed to counterbalance these powerful persuasive forces:  
it places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
As the Supreme Court characterized the presumption:  
“[I]t is the duty of the Government to establish… guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
This notion—basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society—is a 
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law.”57 
The presumption is based on the basic concept that it is worse to convict an innocent person 
than to let a guilty person go free.
Therefore, when a prosecutor tells a jury that the burden is on the defendant to prove his 
innocence, or that there is a presumption of guilt, or in any way implies that the defendant 
needs to present evidence to counter the prosecution’s case, that misconduct undermines our 
greatest protection against wrongful convictions. 
Example:  Harmful Misconduct
In 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the drug smuggling 
convictions of ten defendants based on the prosecutorial misconduct of Assistant 
U.S. Attorney William Gallo.58  The prosecutor improperly told the jury that “the 
presumption of innocence… is going to vanish when you start deliberating.  And that’s 
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when the presumption of guilt is going to take over you.”59  On appeal, the government 
conceded the comment was improper, but argued it was harmless and cured by the 
district court’s instruction.  The appellate court rejected that argument and emphasized 
that criminal defendants have a “constitutional right to the presumption of innocence 
and to have the government prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”60 
Presenting False Evidence
One of the most egregious forms of prosecutorial misconduct is the presentation of false 
testimony or evidence.  This prohibition is absolute.  As the Supreme Court has held:  “The 
prosecution cannot present evidence it knows is false and must immediately correct any falsity 
of which it is aware even if the false evidence was not intentionally submitted.”61  Presenting 
false evidence to the jury harms the defendant’s right to a fair trial by lying to the jury about 
the evidence. NCIP researchers identified 10 cases in which prosecutors were found to have 
presented false evidence.
Example:  Harmful Misconduct  
In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered a new trial for 
Gregory Reyes, Chief Executive Officer of Brocade Communications Systems, who 
had been convicted in federal court of falsifying corporate financial statements. The 
Court ruled that the prosecutor, Assistant U.S. Attorney Timothy Crudo, argued false 
evidence in his closing argument to the jury. Crudo told the jury that the finance 
department did not know the statements were false, even though several members of 
the finance department had earlier told the FBI that they did know that the documents 
were false. Crudo went so far as to show the jury a chart, explaining how each of the 
finance department employees did not know about the falsified records. The Appeals 
Court said, “Deliberate false statements by those privileged to represent the United 
States harm the trial process and the integrity of our prosecutorial system. We do not 
lightly tolerate a prosecutor asserting as a fact to the jury something known to be 
untrue or, at the very least, that the prosecution had very strong reason to doubt.”62 
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Engaging in Discriminatory Jury Selection
Every person accused of a crime in the United States is entitled to a trial by a jury of his or 
her peers.  When selecting that jury, the prosecutor and defense attorney are prohibited from 
eliminating potential jurors based on their membership in specific racial, religious, ethnic or 
similar groups.63  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the Constitution “forbids 
the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption 
that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the state’s case against a 
black defendant.”64  It is prosecutorial misconduct to engage in discriminatory jury selection, 
thereby denying potential jurors the ability to participate in the administration of justice and 
perpetuating racism.  NCIP found 30 cases that included discriminatory jury selection.
Example:  Harmful Misconduct
In 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the murder 
conviction of Richard Kesser because of the misconduct of Humboldt County deputy 
district attorney Worth Dikeman who struck Native Americans from the prospective 
jury pool.65  The prosecutor said that he believed Native Americans were distrustful of 
the criminal justice system and would not be willing to find another Native American 
guilty.  He also said that he heard that “child molesting is okay in certain Native 
American cultures, and we can’t treat Native American child molesters the same way 
we treat other child molesters…”66 
Intimidating a Witness
It is misconduct for a prosecutor to intimidate witnesses to keep them from testifying on behalf 
of the defendant.  When prosecutors threaten witnesses, make them unavailable (for example, 
by arranging to have them deported) 67 or order them not to speak to the defendant or his 
lawyer, they interfere with the defendant’s right to prepare and present his or her defense.
One of the ways that prosecutors intimidate witnesses is by threatening perjury or other 
charges.  If such threats prevent testimony, they violate due process by interfering with 
the defendant’s right to present witnesses in his own defense.68  Misconduct “include[s]… 
statements to defense witnesses to the effect that they would be prosecuted for any crimes they 
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reveal or commit in the course of their testimony.”69  NCIP found 7 court findings of witness 
intimidation. (See, for example, William Ruehle’s case, Part III, A.) 
Violating the Defendant’s Fifth Amendment Right to Silence
People arrested for crimes have an absolute right not to talk to the police or otherwise give 
evidence against themselves.  The privilege against self-incrimination is one of the most 
important constitutional safeguards.  The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right 
against compelled testimony is a “fundamental right”70—indeed, it is “a ‘principle of justice so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people’”71 as to constitute “one of the ‘principles 
of a free government.’”72  Among other consequences, it protects people from harsh, coercive 
interrogations by police, which result in unreliable confessions.  In numerous cases where 
convicted defendants were later exonerated through DNA evidence, false confessions were 
produced by prolonged, coercive interrogations.  
This very important protection against governmental abuse is undermined when prosecutors 
comment about the fact that a defendant invoked his right to be silent upon arrest.  
Prosecutors for example are prohibited from cross-examining a defendant about post-arrest 
silence.  As the Supreme Court has noted, “it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation 
of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation 
subsequently offered at trial.”73 
The same unfairness results when a prosecutor improperly comments on the fact that a 
defendant chose not to testify at trial.  Indeed, to allow a prosecutor to use the defendant’s 
silence at trial as evidence against him renders the right against self-incrimination meaningless:  
a defendant, knowing his silence would be used against him, would feel compelled to testify.  
NCIP uncovered 47 times where a prosecutor committed misconduct by this method.
Example:  Harmless Misconduct  
In 2006, the Court of Appeal found that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
in commenting at trial on the post-arrest silence of defendant Travis Larimer.74  The 
prosecutor not only questioned the defendant about his decision to remain silent, but he 
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elicited testimony from a detective that “it may be inferred that an individual is a gang 
member when he invokes his right to counsel and refuses to speak with police.”75  In 
closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the defendant’s testimony was not believable 
because he had chosen not to speak about the incident at the time of his arrest. 
Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence  
In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the duty of prosecutors to disclose exculpatory 
evidence when it decided Brady v. Maryland.76  Under Brady, it is the prosecution’s 
responsibility to locate and disclose exculpatory information obtained by the police, because 
police are part of the prosecution team. 
Brady violations are among the most pervasive 
forms of prosecutorial misconduct identified in 
the Misconduct Study.  When prosecutors make 
the decision as to whether evidence is Brady 
material, their belief that the defendant is guilty 
can create a distorting prism through which they 
tend to view the evidence inaccurately as a red 
herring or irrelevant.  Brady violations are, by 
their nature, difficult to uncover; they become 
apparent only when the withheld material 
becomes known in other ways.  
Brady violations are among the most pernicious forms of prosecutorial misconduct.  Failure 
to disclose Brady material keeps the jury from considering proper and admissible evidence 
supporting the innocence of the defendant.  Without access to this evidence, innocent 
defendants face a serious risk of being convicted for a crime they did not commit.  
Yet, nearly a half-century after Brady, prosecutors still violate this constitutional imperative.  As 
one of the nation’s leading scholars on prosecutorial misconduct and Brady violations, Professor 
Bennett L. Gershman has stated:  “[A] prosecutor’s violation of the obligation to disclose 
“[A] prosecutor’s violation of the 
obligation to disclose favorable 
evidence accounts for more 
miscarriages of justice than 
any other type of malpractice, 
but is rarely sanctioned by 
courts, and almost never by 
disciplinary bodies.” 
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favorable evidence accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other type of malpractice, 
but is rarely sanctioned by courts, and almost never by disciplinary bodies.”77
It is impossible to know how many Brady violations occur—by their nature they involve 
evidence that is hidden from the defense.  But a study of all 5,760 capital convictions in the 
United States from 1973 to 1995 found that the suppression of evidence by prosecutors was 
responsible for 16 percent of reversals at the state post-conviction stage.78  The Misconduct 
Study uncovered 66 cases where courts found prosecutors had committed Brady violations, 
including several that occurred in death penalty prosecutions.
Example:  Harmful Misconduct
In 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the murder 
conviction of Gloria Killian because Sacramento County deputy district attorney 
Christopher Cleland failed to turn over a letter written by the key prosecution witness, 
stating he had lied to put Killian behind bars.79 
Killian was accused of being the mastermind of a murder and robbery plot and was 
convicted in 1986 primarily on the testimony of an admitted participant in the murder.  
The witness, Gary Masse, had been convicted of the murder and sentenced to life 
without parole; he testified at Killian’s trial that Killian concocted the murder, and he 
also denied that he had any kind of deal for leniency.
Years later, Killian’s lawyers obtained a letter from Masse to the prosecutor that 
the prosecutor had never turned over to the defense, saying that Masse’s testimony 
implicating Killian was a lie.  
Example:  Harmful Misconduct  
In 2004, a Santa Clara County judge overturned the conviction of Damon Auguste 
for sexual assault on the ground that deputy district attorney Benjamin Field failed 
to disclose exculpatory evidence:  DNA lab notes and evidence indicating the victim 
testified falsely against him.80  
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Example:  Harmful Misconduct 
In 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the murder 
conviction and death sentence of Blufford Hayes Jr., finding that San Joaquin County 
deputy district attorney Terrence Van Oss had made a leniency deal with the chief 
prosecution witness, lied about it to a judge and then allowed the witness to testify 
falsely in court that there was no deal.81
B. Cases Declining to Address Misconduct
“For purposes of analysis, we will assume, without deciding, that the prosecutor’s 
statements during her closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct.”
 —People v. Najera, Fourth District Court of Appeal 82
NCIP identified 282 cases in which courts, as in the Najera opinion above, declined to address 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and, as a result, the prosecutors’ actions were never 
scrutinized.  The case of Tyrone Ebaniz is an example of this failure.  
The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for Ebaniz and set aside his life sentence on the 
grounds that newly discovered evidence pointed “unerringly to [his] actual innocence” of 
charges that he willingly took part in the torture and murder of a teenager.83  The new evidence 
consisted of testimony from another participant that Ebaniz had been forced to take part after 
being beaten and threatened with an assault rifle.  “In our view, no reasonable jury could reject 
the new evidence or, upon crediting it, convict Ebaniz,” the court held.84  
Ebaniz also argued that Tulare County deputy district attorney David Alavezos engaged in 
prosecutorial misconduct by asserting during closing argument that Ebaniz was lying about 
being forced to take part in the crime.  Alavezos knew that other defendants’ statements to 
police supported Ebaniz’s claim.  The court said that it was “bothered” by Alavezos’ conduct, 
but it did not reach the question whether it constituted prosecutorial misconduct because 
Ebaniz’s defense attorney had not objected to the argument at trial.85  More than a year after 
the decision, Alavezos said that he had not even read the court’s ruling, claiming that he had 
“never committed prosecutorial misconduct.”86 
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In these 282 decisions, the courts used either of two grounds to decline to address allegations 
of misconduct.  In 204 of the cases, the courts held that even if the prosecutor’s actions were 
misconduct, it would not have changed the verdicts.  In the remaining 78 cases, courts held 
that the defendants’ claims of prosecutorial misconduct were waived and so, as in Ebaniz, 
ignored the issue. 
1. Non-Waiver Cases
In the 204 non-waiver cases—the vast majority of 
the cases—the courts bypassed the critical analysis 
of prosecutorial misconduct by focusing only on 
whether, overall, the trials were fair.  That meant, 
however, that the courts did not also provide 
guidance as to whether the conduct amounted 
to misconduct, and the prosecutor avoided any 
consequences.  
The courts’ reluctance to address misconduct 
extended even to cases where the government did 
not deny that misconduct had occurred.  For example, an issue in the appeal from the murder 
conviction of Michael Gospel was whether the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing 
to the jury that Gospel was a womanizer who wanted to control women and when he could 
not, resorted to murder.87  Even though Gospel argued that there were no facts to support 
this assertion, and even though the government did not attempt to defend the prosecutor’s 
conduct, the Court of Appeal nonetheless evaded the issue, holding that “the comment was 
harmless because it is not reasonably probable that defendant would have (been acquitted) if 
the comment had not been made.”88 
In other cases, appellate courts avoided deciding whether prosecutors’ actions were misconduct 
by concluding that trial judges’ corrective measures were sufficient to ensure a fair trial.  For 
example, in the case of Anaissa Gerwald, the prosecutor, by suggesting that the defendant had 
failed to produce evidence, violated the rule precluding prosecutors from commenting on a 
defendant’s right to remain silent.89  The presiding judge dressed down the prosecutor, saying, 
In the 204 non-waiver 
cases—the vast majority 
of the cases—the courts 
bypassed the critical analysis 
of prosecutorial misconduct 
by focusing only on whether, 
overall, the trials were fair. 
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“You are really on thin ice.  As a defendant [Gerwald] has no obligation to ever do any of that.  
It’s almost—I mean it’s almost mistriable[sic].”90  Yet the Court of Appeal avoided reaching the 
prosecutorial misconduct issue, holding:  “Even if the prosecutor committed misconduct… 
any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”91 
2. Waiver Cases
In the 78 waiver cases, appellate courts refused to consider the claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct because the defense attorneys failed to make a timely or proper objection at trial 
sufficient to preserve the matter for appellate review.  To avoid waiving a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct, defense attorneys must satisfy strict and formal requirements:  they must object to 
the prosecutor’s specific actions, cite the actions as prosecutorial misconduct and request that 
the trial judge specifically instruct the jury about the misconduct.92  Failure to satisfy any one 
of these requirements can result in the permanent loss of appellate review of the issue. 
For example, the Court of Appeal 
recently declined to address claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct, even 
though the prosecutor was accused of 
improperly arguing to the jury that it 
could not acquit unless it rejected the 
testimony of all prosecution witnesses 
and of improperly commenting on 
the defendant’s failure to assert his 
innocence after he was arrested.93  The 
court avoided addressing the allegations 
of misconduct on the grounds that defense counsel did not object to the alleged misconduct, 
saying:  “There is no reason to believe an objection to any of the alleged misconduct would 
have been futile or that an admonition to the jury to disregard any misstatements of law would 
not have been effective.”94 
In the 78 waiver cases, appellate 
courts refused to consider the claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct because 
the defense attorneys failed to make 
a timely or proper objection at trial 
sufficient to preserve the matter for 
appellate review.
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Summary
Prosecutorial misconduct is a critical issue for the integrity of the criminal justice system, 
which the Misconduct Study sought to more fully document.  In 707 cases, courts found 
prosecutors committed misconduct.  In 548 of the cases where misconduct was found, the 
courts nevertheless upheld the convictions by ruling that the misconduct did not alter the 
fundamental fairness of the trial.  In 159 of the 707 cases where misconduct was found, the 
finding resulted in the setting aside of convictions or sentences, declaring mistrials, or barring 
evidence.  Courts refrained from making a ruling on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct and 
instead held that any error would have been harmless or refused to consider the issue because 
the defense failed to make a proper objection in 282 cases. 
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IV. Role of Prosecutors in Addressing Misconduct
“[The] duty of furthering just convictions ‘is [the prosecutor’s] highest purpose.’…  
‘While lawyers representing private parties may—indeed must—do everything ethically 
permissible to advance their clients’ interests, lawyers representing the government in 
criminal cases serve truth and justice first.  The prosecutor’s job isn’t just to win, but 
to win fairly, staying well within the rules.’…  This is so because ‘[s]ociety wins not only 
when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of justice 
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.’”
— Thompson v. Calderon, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 95
Prosecutors have the difficult responsibility of wearing two hats.  On the one hand, they are 
ministers of justice.  Their responsibility is to prosecute only those they believe are guilty 
and use only fair methods in doing so.  The California District Attorneys Association has 
recognized these “strict” ethical obligations, telling its members: 
“In administering justice, a prosecutor must abide by a strict code of ethics…  [The 
primary role of the prosecutor is to ‘investigate and prosecute impartially’ criminal 
suspects on behalf of the People.  Prosecutors should prosecute with ‘earnestness and 
vigor’ while employing only ‘legitimate investigative techniques’ to ensure that ‘guilt 
shall not escape or innocence suffer.’”96  
The American Bar Association also recognizes the special place of prosecutors in our 
constitutional system:  “The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual 
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”97 
On the other hand, prosecutors are advocates:  they aim at “winning the case” by obtaining 
convictions.  In that role, they can be tempted by a variety of improper tactics, such as hiding 
exculpatory evidence, intimidating witnesses and presenting false evidence.  While the majority 
of prosecutors resist those temptations, the Misconduct Study demonstrates that many do not, 
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finding 707 cases of court-identified misconduct—159 of which so undermined the trial’s 
fairness that such drastic remedies as overturning convictions were required.  
Not only are certain prosecutors failing to avoid misconduct, they and others may be failing 
to satisfy their obligation to report it.  Prosecutors, like all attorneys, are bound by the 
requirements of California Business & Professions Code Section 6068(o)(7)  “to report to the 
agency charged with attorney discipline, in writing, within 30 days of the time the attorney has 
knowledge of any of the following:…   Reversal of judgment in a proceeding based in whole or 
in part upon misconduct, grossly incompetent representation, or willful misrepresentation by 
an attorney.”98  While the State Bar does not make public the reports of misconduct it receives, 
it is unlikely that prosecutors are complying with this reporting obligation; there have only 
been six cases of public discipline for prosecutorial misconduct in nearly 13 years.  
Prosecutorial misconduct and failure to report do not occur in a vacuum.  Nor is misconduct 
the result of individual acts performed in isolation.  Rather, incidents of misconduct often 
involve—or are the result of—insufficient training, too much emphasis on winning trials rather 
than doing the right thing, and a culture that does not talk about it.
Because prosecutors are in the best position to prevent misconduct, internal procedures are 
an effective way to prevent and correct errors and misconduct.  Creating a safe, non-punitive 
and open learning environment where prosecutors can freely discuss and learn from mistakes 
is a first important step toward a more open and fair administration of justice.  It can also lead 
to fewer misconduct claims and reduce the need to resort to outside agencies to regulate and 
discipline attorneys.  
It is imperative that prosecutorial agencies establish procedures for identifying and correcting 
error, educate prosecutors in best practices to avoid error and misconduct and establish “an 
environment where winning trials is not the most important measure of success, for the 
individual or the office as a whole.”99   The authors offer some recommendations in this regard 
in Part IX.
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V. Role of the Courts in Addressing Misconduct
“[J]udges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a 
public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system.” 
– Preamble, California Code of Judicial Ethics 100
The California Code of Judicial Ethics details the vital position of judges as leaders of the 
criminal justice system, charged with guarding the integrity of the judicial process.  That 
responsibility includes monitoring the conduct of the attorneys in the cases over which they 
preside.101  The Misconduct Study identifies two areas in which judges’ discharge of this 
responsibility should be improved regarding prosecutors found to have committed misconduct: 
reporting them to the State Bar for potential disciplinary proceedings; and identifying them by 
name in opinions discussing misconduct.  
A. Reporting Prosecutorial Misconduct
California Business and Professions Code Section 6086.7(a), the reporting statute, mandates 
specific circumstances in which a court must report instances of misconduct to the State Bar:  
“A court shall notify the State Bar… (2) Whenever a modification or reversal of a 
judgment in a judicial proceeding is based in whole or in part on the misconduct, 
incompetent representation, or willful misrepresentation of an attorney.”102
The reporting obligation applies only to cases that are reversed or modified as a result of 
misconduct.  The court is also required to notify any attorney that it so reports.103
The limitation of the reporting statute to cases of reversal or modification means that the 
majority of misconduct findings need not be reported.  Of the 707 findings of misconduct 
identified by NCIP researchers, 548 did not fall under the statute.  
Despite the very specific mandate articulated in California law, there is little evidence courts 
are meeting even this limited reporting obligation.  In July 2008, the California Commission 
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on the Fair Administration of Justice (CCFAJ) issued a report quoting the Chief Trial Counsel 
of the State Bar as saying that a review of nearly 30 prosecutorial misconduct reversals failed to 
reveal a single instance of reporting by the appellate courts.104   
One example of such failure to report is illustrative.  In 2009, the Court of Appeal reversed the 
conviction of Harold Ball after finding that Fresno County deputy district attorney Melissa 
Baidzar Baloaian Sahatjian had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence.105  The court, however, 
declined to report Sahatjian’s conduct to the State Bar, because it said it was not “egregious.”106 
The reporting statute does not afford a court the discretion to choose not to report misconduct 
it deems not egregious:  it requires reporting “[w]henever a modification or reversal of a 
judgment in a judicial proceeding is based in whole or in part on the misconduct, incompetent 
representation, or willful misrepresentation of an attorney.”107  The statute evidences 
recognition that any conduct on which reversal is based, even in part, is serious enough to 
require notification of the State Bar concerning potential disciplinary investigation.
In any case, the seriousness of the 
prosecutor’s conduct in Ball cannot be 
disputed.  The prosecutor failed to notify 
the defense attorney when an anticipated 
prosecution witness, upon seeing the 
defendant in the courtroom, said he was 
not the man who attacked the victim; 
instead, the prosecutor simply sent the 
witness home.  Before trial ended, the 
witness told the defense attorney what 
happened, and the prosecutor conceded 
she had sent the witness away without 
notifying the defense.  Nevertheless, the trial judge refused to allow the witness to testify, and 
the defendant was convicted and sentenced to four years in prison.   
The California Commission on 
the Fair Administration of Justice 
issued a report quoting the Chief 
Trial Counsel of the State Bar as 
saying that a review of nearly 30 
prosecutorial misconduct reversals 
failed to reveal a single instance of 
reporting by the appellate courts.
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The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and sentence, finding that the prosecutor’s 
conduct required a new trial.  The court nonetheless declined to report to the State Bar 
the prosecutor’s withholding of crucial exculpatory evidence from the defense, despite the 
unequivocal mandate of the statute, and even though the court noted that the prosecutor “did 
not admit what happened until after defense counsel found out about it independently, and 
there is no way to rule out the possibility that she never would have told otherwise.”108  
NCIP found evidence that the court noted its intent to report misconduct in only six cases.109   
This failure to report prosecutorial misconduct is also documented in the 2008 CCFAJ report.110 
There is some evidence that the CCFAJ report has had some effect.  After its release, the 
California Supreme Court incorporated a segment on reporting misconduct into its training 
sessions for judges and released a new judicial manual that includes guidelines for reporting.111  
Judges are in a unique position to deter misconduct and help prosecutors better understand 
their obligations through their actions and opinions.  Reporting cases of misconduct is a 
critical part of this role.  The Misconduct Study’s authors make specific recommendations as to 
ways in which the courts’ compliance with this obligation can be improved. (See Part IX.)
B. Identifying By Name Prosecutors Found to Have Committed Misconduct
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, one way to deter misbehaving prosecutors is to 
“publicly chastise the prosecutor by identifying him in [the court’s opinion].”112  Unfortunately, 
courts of review only rarely refer to errant prosecutors by name.  NCIP’s review of the 707 
appellate opinions where courts found misconduct reveals that prosecutors were identified in 
only 80 cases.  In 49 of those cases, the prosecutor was referred to only by last name.
The failure to fully identify prosecutors found to have engaged in misconduct has specific 
adverse consequences.  First, the valuable avenue of deterrence the Supreme Court identified is 
undermined, since prosecutors engaged in misconduct are rarely held up to public scrutiny.  
Second, determining what, if any, consequences there were to prosecutors in specific cases of 
misconduct becomes extremely difficult.  When opinions fail to name the prosecutors who 
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State of California, Courts of Appeal, Appellate Districts
Source: California Courts website. Available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/appdistc.pdf
engaged in the misconduct, identifying them usually requires a time-consuming and difficult 
search of the trial record. It was only through such means that NCIP researchers identified the 
prosecutors in 600 of the 707 cases that found prosecutorial misconduct. 
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VI. Role of the California State Bar in Addressing Misconduct
“[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive 
persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an 
association of his peers.”
– Imbler v. Pachtman, United States Supreme Court113 
The State Bar of California, the largest bar association in the nation, has the important 
responsibility of investigating all complaints of attorney misconduct in California, including 
prosecutorial misconduct, and prescribing appropriate discipline.  Its disciplinary proceedings 
and the sanctions imposed serve critical public purposes of punishment, education and 
deterrence, and, more broadly, “the protection of the public, the courts and the legal 
profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation 
of public confidence in the legal profession.”114  It has not been achieving these purposes in the 
case of prosecutorial misconduct.
A. Failure to Discipline Prosecutorial Misconduct
The Misconduct Study reveals that the State Bar rarely publicly disciplines prosecutorial 
misconduct.  It is impossible to determine the reasons for this failure to discipline without 
public information concerning the number of reports or complaints of prosecutorial 
misconduct the Bar receives, the number of those it investigates115 and the number that result 
in private discipline.116
Regardless of the reasons, the facts of disciplinary failure are undeniable:  of the 4,741 public 
disciplinary actions reported in the California State Bar Journal in a nearly thirteen-year  
period—from January 1997 to September 2009—only ten involved prosecutors, and only six 
of these were for conduct in the handling of a criminal case.117  
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The six that were disciplined for prosecutorial misconduct had all withheld evidence:    
 ■ Santa Clara County deputy district attorney Benjamin Field was suspended for four years 
in 2010 for misconduct in multiple cases over a decade, including violating a court order, 
withholding evidence in two separate cases and making a deceptive closing argument.118 
 ■ San Joaquin County deputy district attorney Michael Freeman stipulated to withholding 
evidence from the defense, resulting in a public reprimand in 2009.119
 ■ Santa Clara County deputy district attorney Peter Waite was publicly reprimanded in 2009 
for suppressing an expert opinion that was favorable to the defense in a burglary, rape and 
robbery prosecution.120
 ■ Sonoma County deputy district attorney Brooke Halsey was suspended for three years in 
2007 for multiple violations, including suppression of evidence, misleading a judge and 
making false representations in court.121
 ■ Butte County deputy district attorney Leo Barone was suspended for one year in 2005 for 
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence and making misrepresentations to the court and 
defense.122
 ■ San Diego County deputy district attorney James Fitzpatrick was placed on probation 
for two years in 2005 for willfully failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, 
violating a court order and being untruthful.123
However, there are numerous other cases where prosecutors suppressed critical evidence, just as 
in the six cases of discipline, but have no public record of discipline.  These include:
 ■ In 1999, a conviction obtained by San Diego County deputy district attorney Keith Burt 
was reversed because “the prosecution withheld crucial discoverable evidence, presented 
false or misleading evidence and made misrepresentations in its closing argument to  
the jury.”124  
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 ■ In 2006, a Federal District Court judge found Los Angeles County deputy district 
attorney Sterling Norris had withheld exculpatory information.125  
 ■ In 2008, a Riverside County Superior Court judge dismissed a narcotics prosecution after 
ruling that deputy district attorney Edward Hong intentionally withheld evidence from 
the defense.126  
 ■ In 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found former San Joaquin 
County deputy district attorney Terence Van Oss failed to turn over exculpatory evidence 
and allowed a witness to falsely testify in a death penalty prosecution.127  Van Oss has 
never been disciplined; he has been a judge in the Superior Court of San Joaquin County 
since 1990.
The six disciplined prosecutors were all disciplined after 2004 and the establishment of the 
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice.128  Prior to 2005, not a single 
prosecutor was disciplined for conduct in a criminal case, and to date, no California prosecutor 
has been disbarred for prosecutorial misconduct.
Number of Multiple Offenders Disciplined by the State Bar: Only six multiple offenders out of the 67 identified in this study have been 
disciplined by the State Bar as noted in the California State Bar Journal. Of those six multiple offenders, five of them committed misconduct 
in two cases and one committed misconduct in three cases.
2-Case Offenders
5
Disciplined
6
Multiple Offenders
Not Disciplined
61
3-Case Offender
1
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B. Failure to Discipline Prosecutors with Repeat Violations
The published records also reveal that many of the undisciplined prosecutors were repeat 
offenders.  In the cases of prosecutorial misconduct in which NCIP was able to identify the 
prosecutor involved, 67 had committed misconduct multiple times, three of these committed 
misconduct four times and two did so five times.  All six prosecutors who were disciplined are 
multiple offenders. 
A striking example of repeat prosecutorial misconduct that has not been publicly disciplined 
is Los Angeles County deputy district attorney Grace Rai.  In October 2008, the Court of 
Appeal reversed the conviction of Mark Broughton and severely criticized Rai’s conduct in 
prosecuting the case.129  The court found that Rai committed serial misconduct that included 
asking improper questions, eliciting inadmissible evidence and hearsay, disobeying court 
orders and making improper arguments.  Finding that many of Rai’s violations were of “major 
Misconduct Committed by Multiple Offenders: NCIP researchers found that multiple offenders committed misconduct in both harmful 
(convictions or sentences set aside, mistrials declared, or evidence barred) and harmless (convictions upheld) cases. This chart details the 
breakdown of cases by how many cases were handled by multiple offenders who committed misconduct two, three, four, and five times.  For 
example, the first bar details the number of cases handled by two-time multiple offenders broken down into harmful and harmless. 
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significance,” the court stated:  “We think that absent the prosecutorial misconduct, there was 
a reasonable probability the verdict would have been different.”130  
This was not the first time that an appellate court criticized Rai for misconduct.  In 2006, the 
Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction of Calvin Benn, but found Rai engaged in regrettable 
conduct that was “not to be condoned,” “fell below acceptable professional standards” and in all 
likelihood knowingly violated a court order.131 
Despite these explicit findings of misconduct, public State Bar records reveal no discipline of 
Rai.  This failure cannot be explained by the court’s failure to report the misconduct:  in 2008 
the court in the Broughton case specifically directed that its finding of Rai’s misconduct be sent 
to the Bar.  
Rai’s case is not unique.  Among the prosecutors with multiple findings of misconduct who 
have no public record of discipline are the following:
 ■ Los Angeles County deputy district attorney Michael Duarte was cited for failing to 
disclose exculpatory evidence and altering notes of an interview with a witness, causing 
mistrials in two separate prosecutions.132  A trial court judge fined him $1,000 for his 
conduct in one case.  
 ■ Los Angeles County deputy district attorney Robin Sax Katzenstein committed 
misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence in two cases, resulting in reversals of 
convictions in 2008 and 2009.133
 ■ Orange County deputy district attorney Michael Flory has been found to have 
committed misconduct in five cases—in one the conviction was reversed for his 
engaging in discriminatory jury selection; in the other four the misconduct was held to 
be harmless error.134
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C. In Contrast, Active Discipline of Non-Prosecutors
It’s not that the State Bar does not discipline lawyers.  From January 1997 through September 
2009, the State Bar published 4,741 discipline records detailing a variety of offenses, primarily 
financial violations and breach of duty to clients by private attorneys.135 
A total of 586 lawyers were disbarred.  The majority of the other public disciplinary actions 
were suspensions, probation and reprovals for misconduct that ranged from the egregious to 
the more innocuous.  For example, in 2000, Jeffrey Nelson was suspended for 20 months after 
pleading guilty to a criminal misdemeanor (later dismissed) for bouncing an $850 check from 
his personal account.136 
Nor is the Bar reluctant to discipline criminal defense attorneys, even when they do not 
discipline the same conduct by prosecutors.  For example, the Bar suspended criminal defense 
attorney Maureen Kallins137 for two years because she “repeatedly crossed the line from zealous 
Types of Public Discipline 1997–2009*: This chart depicts the major types of discipline reported by the California State Bar Journal to all 
attorneys from 1997 through September 2009. Based on our methodology, NCIP researchers found that the Bar disciplined many attorneys 
during the years reviewed. However, only 10 out of 4,462 disciplinary actions involved prosecutors. 
* NCIP reviewed through September 2009
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advocacy to contemptuous disrespect for the 
courtroom.”138  Yet, the Bar never disciplined 
Los Angeles County deputy district attorney 
Rosalie Morton, even though courts found 
she had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct 
in four cases, three of which resulted in 
reversal of convictions, including tactics that 
were “petty and childish, heightening the 
acrimonious atmosphere in the courtroom 
and threatening the ability of defendant to 
receive a fair trial.”139  
The failure by the State Bar to publicly discipline prosecutors sends a message that prosecutors 
can commit misconduct with impunity.  Prosecutors, in effect, know they can commit 
misconduct to obtain convictions. 
D. The Bar’s Recent Responses to Criticism
There have been recent signs of progress in the State Bar’s approach to prosecutorial discipline.  
In 2009, the California State Bar, responding to the CCFAJ report and its recommendations, 
unanimously agreed to reaffirm “its commitment to establishing and monitoring disciplinary 
policies that support the primary purposes of the disciplinary proceedings conducted by and of 
the sanctions imposed by the State Bar of California, specifically, the protection of the public, 
the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys 
and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession.”140
The State Bar also unanimously agreed that it would begin separating the reports of 
misconduct made to it to distinguish seven categories of attorneys, including prosecutors, 
and make the number of complaints public.141  As a result, the State Bar’s Office of the Chief 
Trial Counsel installed new reportable action screens into its computer system to track reports 
against attorneys in a manner consistent with the CCFAJ Report.142
The failure by the State Bar to 
publicly discipline prosecutors 
sends a message that prosecutors 
can commit misconduct with 
impunity.  Prosecutors, in 
effect, know they can commit 
misconduct to obtain convictions.
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Specifically, the CCFAJ had recommended that the State Bar include in its annual report 
on the State Bar’s discipline system the number of reportable actions143 received from courts 
pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6068.7(a),144 any reportable actions that 
involve any one of seven identified categories of egregious conduct;145 and the number of 
reportable actions related to the conduct of prosecutors and defense lawyers for each county.  
This data will be published in the Bar’s 2010 Annual Report to be issued in April 2011.146
We applaud these efforts to adopt the CCFAJ recommendations.147  However, more 
accountability and transparency is needed. In conjunction with the California courts, records 
of compliance with the reporting statute should be made public. (see Part IX)  
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VII. Costs and Consequences of Prosecutorial Misconduct
“Crime is contagious.  If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt 
for the law… it breeds anarchy.” 
– Olmstead v. United States, United States Supreme Court 1928; Justice Brandeis, dissenting 148
The devastating effects of prosecutorial misconduct cannot be overestimated.  The costs are 
financial, emotional, psychological and societal.  The adversely affected include innocent 
defendants wrongly convicted, taxpayers forced to bear the massive expenses of protracted 
litigation and incarceration, crime victims and their family members required to relive their 
pain, and, more broadly, the public in general, whose trust in the entire criminal justice system 
is undermined.  
A. Consequences for Innocent Defendants Wrongly Convicted
There is no more harmful consequence of prosecutorial misconduct than the conviction of the 
innocent.  Yet it occurs repeatedly, causing devastating damage to the lives of the innocent, as 
well as those victimized by true perpetrators who remain free.
DNA exoneration cases provide an avenue to identify and analyze the consequences for 
innocent persons who were wrongly convicted in connection with prosecutorial misconduct.  
With the advent of DNA testing, biological material recovered from crime scenes can now be 
used to identify with scientific certainty the identity of the true perpetrator.  This has led to the 
exoneration of more than 250 people who were wrongfully convicted of heinous crimes, as well 
as, in many cases, the identification and arrest of the actual perpetrators.
In studies of these DNA exoneration cases, prosecutorial misconduct has been identified as 
one of seven primary causes of wrongful conviction.149  Two recent studies have shown the 
alarming frequency in which courts upheld convictions of innocent people, including in cases 
of prosecutorial misconduct, incorrectly finding harmless error.
VERITAS INITIATIVE
65
VII. COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES
In August 2010, Dr. Emily West analyzed 
255 cases where DNA proved the person 
convicted was innocent and determined that 
prosecutorial misconduct was raised as an issue 
on appeal or in a civil law suit in 65 cases.150  
Of these 65 cases, courts rejected the claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct in 34.  Of the 31 
cases in which the courts found prosecutorial 
misconduct, they ruled 12 harmful and 19 
harmless.151  It is troubling to see how often 
courts declare misconduct to be harmless when 
the defendant is in fact innocent, even holding that the evidence of guilt is  “strong.”152
While DNA exonerations conclusively establish innocence, most exonerees prove their 
innocence using non-DNA evidence.  In California, three examples of innocence cases that 
involved prosecutorial misconduct are: 
 ■ In 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction 
of Gloria Killian after finding that the prosecutor had failed to turn over exculpatory 
evidence:  a letter written by the sole prosecution witness, stating he had lied to put Killian 
behind bars.  Killian won her release after 18 years in prison.153
 ■ In 2003, Quedellis “Rick” Walker was freed from prison after serving nearly 12 years for a 
murder he did not commit.  Evidence surfaced that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the 
defense leniency deals with the state witness who lied to implicate Walker.154
 ■ In 2000, Oscar Lee Morris was freed after serving 16 years in prison for murder because a 
Los Angeles County Superior Court judge set aside his conviction and ordered a new trial.  
An appellate court in 1988 had found that the prosecutor hid evidence of a secret deal 
with the state’s key witness, but found the misconduct harmless.  Morris won his release a 
decade later after the witness admitted he had lied.155     
Two recent studies have shown 
the alarming frequency in which 
courts upheld convictions of 
innocent people, including 
in cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct, incorrectly finding 
harmless error.
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It is impossible to overestimate the magnitude of the wrong done to an innocent person 
wrongfully convicted of a crime.  The psychological, emotional and economic harm can be 
equivalent to the destruction of a life.   
The impact of incarceration is devastating; 
defendants lose much more than their freedom.  
In addition to the pain of separation from friends 
and family, imprisonment can result in loss of 
education, employment, job skills, earnings and 
physical health.  The innocent further must deal 
with the psychological dissonance of having been 
profoundly wronged by society.156  
In 2007, a New York Times study of 137 DNA exonerees found that most “have struggled to 
keep jobs, pay for health care, rebuild family ties and shed the psychological effects of years of 
questionable or wrongful imprisonment.”157 Economic harm, of course, is significant.  Studies 
have found that more than 90 percent of exonerees lost all their assets—savings, vehicles, 
houses —while imprisoned.158  Of those who were able to obtain jobs after their release, 43 
percent were paid less than they earned prior to their imprisonment.159  
Only in extremely limited circumstances can the exonerated prevail in civil litigation against 
the prosecutors whose misconduct caused their wrongful conviction.  In 1976, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Imbler v. Pachtman,160 holding that when prosecutors act within 
the scope of their duties they are absolutely immune from civil liability.  The Court based 
its conclusion on its belief that “[p]rosecutors must be free to make discretionary decisions 
without constant dread of retaliation,” even though it openly acknowledged that their decision 
would “leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest [prosecutors].” 161  As a result, civil 
lawsuits against prosecutors usually are dismissed soon after the cases are brought to court; the 
rare cases of recovery against prosecutors is for conduct in a non-prosecutorial capacity.162  (See 
Part VIII.)
Of those who were able to 
obtain jobs after their release, 
43 percent were paid less 
than they earned prior to their 
imprisonment.
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B. Financial Costs to Taxpayers
“Needless to say, the conduct which compels the result we reach in this case has 
generated substantial costs to the public.  The expense of the lengthy trials, which 
have now gone for naught, the costs of the proceedings undertaken in this court in 
order to uncover the misconduct in the earlier trials, and the cost of an additional 
retrial, should that take place, are very high and wholly regrettable.”
– People v. Butler, Fourth District Court of Appeal 163
Prosecutorial misconduct imposes a heavy 
financial cost on cities and counties, primarily 
borne by taxpayers, through prolonged criminal 
litigation and incarceration.  These massive costs 
provide another reason that society should care 
about prosecutorial misconduct, even in cases 
where the defendants in fact are guilty. Moreover, 
it has resulted in substantial payments by cities 
and counties in several civil cases alleging 
prosecutorial misconduct.  And taxpayers also 
ultimately bear the costs of any compensation 
paid those who were wrongly convicted.
1. Financial Costs from Prolonged Criminal Litigation
The costs of the prolonged criminal litigation that prosecutorial misconduct can entail 
are staggering, through retrials—some defendants were tried as many as four times—and 
multiple appeals. 
The Butler case quoted above, which lasted more than 12 years, is a prime example.  In 
1999, the court reversed the 1994 convictions of Stacy Butler and three other defendants 
for murdering a police officer, based on the “serious prosecutorial misconduct” of San Diego 
County deputy district attorney Keith Burt.  It found that Burt not only used false and 
The costs of the prolonged 
criminal litigation that 
prosecutorial misconduct can 
entail are staggering, through 
retrials—some defendants 
were tried as many as four 
times—and multiple appeals.
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misleading evidence at trial, but he provided a key witness numerous benefits, including 
transferring the witness from prison to the District Attorney’s office to have sex with his wife, 
none of which was disclosed to the defense.  In 1991, nine years before the case would be 
concluded, the San Diego Union-Tribune164 estimated the cost of the prosecution of the case 
would likely top $2 million. 
The NCIP investigation found cases that dragged on even longer, some for more than two 
decades, no doubt costing taxpayers many millions more.  The prosecution of Blufford Hayes 
Jr. is currently in its 30th year.  Granted a retrial on murder charges because former San Joaquin 
County district attorney Terrence Van Oss hid evidence and presented false evidence,165 Hayes 
has been awaiting retrial since 2005.  The cost of the prosecution exceeds $1 million.166    
Taxpayers also bear the high cost of prolonged incarceration resulting from the drawn-out 
litigation of prosecutorial misconduct cases.  The financial cost of housing inmates is high:  in 
2009 California spent $45,000 per year per inmate. Taxpayers have paid over $240,000 to 
house Blufford Hayes in the San Joaquin County Jail since 2005.167  
2. Financial Costs from Civil Lawsuits
Another source of financial cost to taxpayers resulting from prosecutorial misconduct is 
settlements and judgments in civil lawsuits.  While the doctrine of absolute immunity 
for prosecutors acting within the scope of their duties usually results in their dismissal in 
such cases, a civil case involving prosecutorial misconduct that includes other defendants 
nonetheless can result in payments by cities and counties.  
For example, in 2006, David Genzler, who had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter 
and served five years in prison, sued the county of San Diego as well as former prosecutor Peter 
Longanbach168 and a district attorney’s office investigator.169 The lawsuit sought $5.5 million 
in damages, alleging that Longanbach had committed prosecutorial misconduct by coaching 
a witness to lie against Genzler and by failing to turn over information favorable to his 
defense.170  Two years after a federal judge ruled that Longanbach was not covered by immunity 
provisions because he was acting in an investigative capacity, the case settled, with the county 
of San Diego paying Genzler an undisclosed sum.171
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In Santa Clara County, four lawsuits alleging prosecutorial misconduct have cost taxpayers over 
$5 million in settlements over the past five years, in addition to litigation costs.  In 2005, Santa 
Clara taxpayers paid nearly $1 million to Glen Nickerson, who spent almost nineteen years in 
prison before his murder conviction was overturned due to evidence of police and prosecutorial 
misconduct. 172  In 2007, the county paid exonerated criminal defendant Rick Walker $2.75 
million in settlement of a lawsuit alleging prosecutorial misconduct. 173  
In 2009, the county authorized a $750,000 settlement of a lawsuit alleging prosecutorial 
misconduct against deputy district attorney Benjamin Field, in a rare case in which the 
prosecutor was not dismissed before trial on the basis of immunity.  The settlement occurred 
after the court held that trial was required to determine whether Field was entitled to 
immunity, because factual issues remained as to whether he sought to obtain a search warrant 
in direct violation of a court order.174  That same year, the county paid $1 million to Jeffrey 
Rodriguez to settle a lawsuit that also included allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.175  
Santa Clara County is not the only county with high incidences of prosecutorial misconduct, 
as well as big payouts.  For example, in August 2010 the city of Long Beach paid out an $8 
million settlement in a case alleging prosecutorial misconduct brought by Thomas Goldstein.176 
Goldstein, who was convicted of a 1979 murder in Long Beach, spent 24 years in prison 
before being released after a federal judge ruled that Los Angeles County prosecutors withheld 
evidence of deals with a jailhouse informant and failed to correct perjured testimony.
Goldstein sued the prosecution, Long Beach police officers and the City of Long Beach, 
asserting that former Los Angeles County district attorney John Van De Kamp and his chief 
deputy failed to adequately train and supervise their deputies on their obligations relating to 
informants and failed to establish a system that would have facilitated information-sharing 
among deputy prosecutors.  Although the Supreme Court rejected Goldstein’s argument 
and expanded the prosecutorial actions covered by absolute immunity to activities that cast 
them “in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate,” 177 
Goldstein was permitted to pursue his lawsuit against Long Beach, resulting in the settlement.  
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Lawsuits continue.  In May 2010, Augustin Uribe filed a suit against Santa Clara County 
and deputy district attorney Troy Benson seeking $38 million, alleging that Benson’s failure 
to turn over exculpatory evidence violated his constitutional right to a fair trial.  A motion to 
dismiss is pending.178
3. Financial Costs of Compensation 
Taxpayers may also be liable for the statutory costs of compensation to victims of wrongful 
imprisonment due to prosecutorial misconduct.  California’s compensation statute requires 
that exonerees receive compensation in the amount of  $100 a day for each day of wrongful 
incarceration. 179   To date the California Compensation Board has approved payout of over $3 
million under this statute.180   
C. Emotional Costs of Protracted Litigation for Victims of Crime
When criminal cases are prolonged as a result of prosecutorial misconduct, crime victims 
and their families also suffer.  Retrials and the lengthy appellate process harm surviving crime 
victims and their families, as they endure the unraveling of convictions and are forced to relive 
the crime on retrial.  Because the lapse in time often weakens the prosecution’s case, they watch 
helplessly as prosecutors negotiate plea agreements rather than seek retrial, frequently resulting 
in lesser sentences or the release of the defendants. 
D. Consequences for the Criminal Justice System
Prosecutorial misconduct also has significant adverse implications for the criminal justice 
system as a whole.
First, there can be major damage to the viability of the prosecutions in proceedings drawn out 
due to prosecutorial misconduct.  With the passage of time, testimony becomes less exact, and 
evidence is lost or destroyed.  Memories fade.  Witnesses disappear or die.  In some cases, the 
misconduct itself so damages the credibility of the prosecution that after a reversal, the only 
pragmatic approach is to negotiate a plea agreement that allows the defendant to walk free.
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Second, when the innocent are convicted through prosecutorial misconduct, the guilty remain 
free and often commit other crimes.  In some cases where DNA profiles exonerated the 
innocent and were linked to the true criminals, authorities discovered that many continued 
engaging in crime.
A stark example is the 1980 wrongful conviction of Kevin Green in Orange County Superior 
Court for assaulting his pregnant wife and murdering her unborn fetus. 181  By the time he was 
exonerated in 1996, police had discovered that the real assailant was Gerald Parker, nicknamed 
the “Bludgeon Killer.”  Parker had committed five murders prior to the attack on Green’s wife; 
and while law enforcement and prosecutors focused on Kevin Green, Parker remained free and 
committed other crimes, including the rape of a 13-year-old girl.182  
Third, prosecutorial misconduct is perpetuated through failure to deter.  The Supreme Court’s 
assumption in Imbler v. Patchman that prosecutors would be deterred as a result of state bar 
disciplinary proceedings has proven to be false.  As this study demonstrates, the California 
State Bar rarely disciplines prosecutors who are found to have engaged in misconduct.  Because 
the Bar has not fulfilled its responsibility to educate and deter misconduct through discipline, 
prosecutors know they can continue to commit misconduct to obtain convictions with almost 
no risk of reversal.  
Finally, prosecutorial misconduct undermines public confidence in the entire criminal justice 
system.  As the Supreme Court emphasized in Brady v. Maryland, “our system of justice suffers 
when any accused is treated unfairly.” 183  Prosecutors bear a heavy responsibility entrusted 
by the public, and they are expected to discharge their duties honestly and, most of all, fairly.  
When they do not, the costs extend beyond the damaging consequences in the individual 
case.   Prosecutorial misconduct fundamentally undermines public trust in the reliability of the 
justice system and subverts the notion that we are a fair society. 
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VIII. Prosecutorial Immunity from Civil Liability
“[I]t is by no means true that such blanket absolute immunity is necessary or even 
helpful in protecting the judicial process.”
 – Imbler v. Pachtman, United States Supreme Court, Justice White, concurring 184
The injustice to the exonerated continues after incarceration:  they are denied any recourse 
against the prosecutors whose misconduct resulted in their wrongful conviction.  In 1976, the 
United States Supreme Court held in Imbler v. Pachtman185  that prosecutors are absolutely 
immune from liability for conduct within the scope of their duties; they can be sued only 
when they are engaged in other activities, such as investigative or administrative tasks.  Most 
recently, in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,186  the Court expanded absolute immunity by limiting 
the scope of that exception, protecting a district attorney and a former chief deputy district 
attorney from liability for training and supervisory failures that resulted in withholding of 
impeachment material.  The Court, reiterating Imbler’s rationales, held that while training and 
supervision concerning “how and when to make impeachment information available at a trial” 
were management responsibilities, they nonetheless were absolutely immunized from liability 
because they were “directly connected with the prosecutor’s basic trial advocacy duties.”187 
The adoption of the absolute immunity doctrine resulted from the Imbler Court’s attempt 
to balance competing interests.  The Court explicitly recognized the irreparable harm to the 
innocent that the absolute immunity doctrine causes:  “To be sure, this immunity does leave 
the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious 
or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”188   However, it reasoned that applying a doctrine 
of qualified immunity—where a prosecutor could be held liable depending on the specific 
“circumstances and motivations of his actions”189 —“would prevent the vigorous and fearless 
performance of the prosecutor’s duty.”190   On balance, the Court held, it is “better to leave 
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their 
duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”191  The Court emphasized that misconduct would 
still be deterred and prosecutors punished, because a prosecutor is subject “to professional 
discipline by an association of his peers.”192     
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The Court’s reasoning does not withstand scrutiny, as a variety of commentators have pointed 
out.193   First, the balance the Court struck is incorrectly skewed because the Court misjudged 
how qualified immunity would affect honest prosecutors.  The stringent requirements to 
surmount a qualified immunity defense provide ethical prosecutors adequate protection to 
ensure independent performance of their duties:  the victim of misconduct would need to 
prove that the prosecutor violated clearly-established constitutional law with a culpable state 
of mind.  As the Supreme Court has noted in other contexts, the qualified immunity defense 
“provides ample protection to all.”194   Other professionals, like physicians, are required to 
perform under the pressure of potential liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct; 
there is no reason prosecutors cannot do the same.
Second, as the Misconduct Study has shown, the Court was incorrect in its assumption that 
prosecutorial misconduct would be deterred and punished by the disciplinary bodies charged 
with the responsibility of regulating attorney conduct.  In California, six cases of State Bar 
discipline in 13 years shows that public discipline is rare; 707 cases finding prosecutorial 
misconduct show that deterrence, if it exists, is inadequate.  In contrast, allowing the possibility 
of civil liability under the limited circumstances of qualified immunity would greatly increase 
deterrence.  As Justice White pointed out in Imbler:  “It should hardly need stating that, 
ordinarily, liability in damages for unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct has the very 
desirable effect of deterring such conduct.”195   Absolute immunity allows prosecutors to 
commit misconduct with impunity, knowing that they are immune from any consequences, 
even if they act intentionally, in bad faith or with malice.   
Finally, the doctrine of absolute immunity not only denies the innocent a remedy and fails to 
deter prosecutorial misconduct; it violates the integrity of the criminal justice system.  As one 
commentator noted:
“Absolute prosecutorial immunity undermines this compelling obligation to protect 
the innocent and to see that justice shall be done.  We are not concerned here with 
minor breaches of professional etiquette.  Prosecutors who engage in misconduct strike 
not just hard blows, but criminal blows.  Specifically, when a prosecutor violates a 
person’s due process rights, the violation is a crime.  Subornation of perjury is a crime.  
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Tampering with and coercing witnesses is a crime.  Using false evidence before a grand 
jury or court is a crime. Yet the prosecutors who engage in this criminal conduct are not 
prosecuted, are not disciplined, and are not held liable for their crimes.”196  
The Supreme Court recently has shown a heightened interest in addressing issues of 
prosecutorial immunity, agreeing to hear three such cases in the past two years.197  Hopefully, 
the Court will recognize the injustice of the absolute immunity doctrine and instead adopt 
qualified immunity for prosecutorial misconduct, as the authors recommend (see Court-
Related Reforms, Part IX,B,4).
IX.  
Recommendations 
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IX. Recommendations
This in-depth analysis of prosecutorial accountability in California has proven that the 
system is flawed.  Prosecutors commit misconduct, some repeatedly.  Courts fail to report 
this misconduct despite their legal obligation to do so.  The State Bar almost never holds the 
prosecutors accountable.
Each of these actors has an important role in prosecutorial accountability.  The authors 
recommend reforms affecting each of them as first steps toward the goal of eliminating 
prosecutorial misconduct in criminal cases.  
A. Attorney-Related Reforms 
1. Ethics Training
The California State Bar, in conjunction with the California District Attorneys Association, 
California Public Defenders Association and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, should 
develop a course specifically designed to address ethical issues that commonly arise in criminal cases. 
These sessions should include the specific obligations to disclose exculpatory evidence; 
guidelines for avoiding misconduct in court, such as improper impeachment and arguments; 
and other areas where there is a demonstrated recurrence of misconduct.  Training would 
help both prosecutors and defense counsel better understand their ethical obligations.  Public 
defenders, prosecutors and private attorneys handling predominately criminal cases should be 
required to take the course once every three years.  
2. Internal Misconduct Policies
District Attorney offices should adopt internal policies that do not tolerate misconduct, 
including establishing internal reviews of error. 
As part of their internal policies, District Attorney offices should establish internal disciplinary 
processes and institute uniform procedures for tracking and investigating complaints of 
misconduct.  Examples from other professions provide good models.  Many large medical 
centers hold “Morbidity and Mortality” conferences that conduct peer reviews of any errors 
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that led to serious complications or patient death.  Comparable models should be instituted to 
address misconduct in criminal cases.  
3. Exculpatory Evidence Policies
District Attorney offices and law enforcement agencies should adopt written administrative 
exculpatory evidence policies to govern Brady compliance.
These exculpatory evidence policies should be publicly available, and the agencies should 
provide in-house trainings regarding them.198  The policies should include procedures for 
collecting Brady material, tracking its delivery and disclosing it to the defense. Prosecutors 
should develop checklists for Brady disclosure obligations that can help ensure that police 
are turning over all Brady material to prosecutors and that prosecutors are turning over that 
material to defense in turn.199  Material relevant to factual innocence or an affirmative defense 
should be disclosed as soon as that determination is made, and prior to entry of a guilty plea.200 
B. Court-Related Reforms
1. Expansion of the Reporting Requirement of Business and Professions Code  
Section 6086.7
The reporting statute should be expanded to require judicial reporting of any finding of 
“egregious” misconduct as defined by the California Commission on the Fair Administration 
of Justice (CCFAJ), as well as any constitutional violation by a prosecutor or defense attorney, 
regardless of whether it resulted in modification or reversal of the judgment, including 
violations of ethical rules. 
As noted, California Business and Professional Code section 6086.7 currently requires that 
courts report misconduct to the State Bar only when there is a reversal or modification in a 
judgment as a result of attorney misconduct.    
As noted by the CCFAJ report, noncompliance is a problem. To address it, following the 
publication of the CCFAJ report in 2008, the California Supreme Court introduced a 
component into their judicial education program explaining the court’s obligation to report 
under the statute. The authors applaud this effort, but more is needed.  
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The Misconduct Study shows that prosecutorial misconduct has serious adverse consequences 
(see Part VII), regardless of whether in the context of the overall case it constituted harmful error. 
The authors therefore recommend that section 6086.7 be expanded to include a requirement 
to report any “egregious” misconduct, as defined by but not limited to the types detailed in the 
CCFAJ Final Report:  willful misrepresentation, appearance while intoxicated, willful unlawful 
discrimination, suppression of exculpatory evidence, willful presentation of perjured testimony, 
willful unlawful disclosure of information and failure to properly identify self.  Further, the 
courts should report any misdeeds amounting to a constitutional violation, such as interfering 
with defense witnesses and commenting on the Fifth Amendment right to silence.
For reporting to deter misconduct adequately, a prosecutor should be reported based on 
the seriousness of the conduct and not on the guilt of the defendant.  Any doubt whether 
misconduct is egregious should be resolved in favor of reporting the misconduct.
2. Inclusion of Attorney Names In Opinions
Judges should be required to list attorneys’ full names in opinions finding misconduct.  
Full identification of the attorneys whose misconduct would be reported under an expanded 
version of  section 6086.7 (see Court-Related Reform number 1) not only will provide more 
transparency and a potential deterrence due to being publicly named, but will provide notice to 
those attorneys that what they did was improper.
3. California Supreme Court Monitoring of Reporting
The California Supreme Court should actively monitor compliance with the requirements of 
judicial reporting and notification of attorneys mandated by Business and Professions Code 
section 6086.7.  Records of compliance—a list of cases reported to the State Bar by the courts—
should be publicly available.  
The findings of the Misconduct Study show that it is virtually impossible to assess judicial 
compliance with the obligation to report misconduct to the State Bar and to notify attorneys 
found to have committed misconduct. It is also clear that there is a critical need to track 
misconduct so that it may be identified and addressed. More transparency is needed to restore 
trust in the justice system and therefore, records of compliance should be made public. 
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4. Elimination of Absolute Immunity for Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Prosecutors should be entitled at best to qualified immunity.  
As noted, under current law prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil liability for their 
misconduct, even where they acted intentionally, in bad faith or with malice.  The authors 
recommend that absolute immunity for prosecutors be abandoned and replaced in all 
circumstances by qualified immunity, to deter and ensure accountability for such misconduct 
and allow redress for its victims.  Qualified immunity protects “government officials…from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”201  When applying 
qualified immunity, courts ask whether the law governing the official’s conduct was clearly 
established; and whether, under that law, a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct 
was lawful.202
Qualified immunity will still protect honest prosecutors whose misconduct results from actions 
taken in good faith and without malice.  But victims of prosecutorial misconduct will have 
recourse against prosecutors who commit misconduct knowingly and intentionally.  
C. State Bar-Related Reforms
1. Special Responsibilities of Prosecutors
California should adopt American Bar Association’s Model Rule 3.8.
The California State Bar is currently in the process of adopting ethical rules more in line with 
the ABA Model Rules, including Rule 3.8.  Model Rule 3.8 deals specifically with the special 
responsibilities of prosecutors, making it a disciplinary offense to prosecute a charge without 
probable cause, seek to have an unrepresented defendant waive rights, subpoena a lawyer in a 
grand jury proceeding or make public comments that might harm a defendant.  The rule also 
mandates that prosecutors disclose all exculpatory or mitigating evidence and make reasonable 
efforts to ensure a defendant knows of their right to counsel.203  The authors recommend 
that California join the other 49 states who have already adopted some form of Rule 3.8 by 
adopting it in its entirety. 
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2. Enforcement and Accountability 
The State Bar should expand discipline for prosecutorial misconduct and increase disciplinary 
transparency.   
Revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct will not deter misconduct unless the State 
Bar disciplines prosecutors for their ethical violations.  While the Bar has limited resources, 
and while financial violations and client protection are crucial, the Misconduct Study’s 
demonstration of the importance of prosecutorial misconduct warrants heightened scrutiny 
in this area.  The lack of transparency of the Bar’s disciplinary process makes it difficult to 
monitor the extent to which the Bar is addressing issues of prosecutorial misconduct.  
As discussed in Part VI, the California State Bar has agreed to separate reports of misconduct 
to the State Bar in a manner consistent with the CCFAJ Report.  It also agreed to include in 
its 2010 Annual Report the number of reportable actions pursuant to Business and Professions 
Code section 6068.7(a),204 any reportable actions that involve any one of seven identified 
categories of egregious conduct205 and the number of reportable actions related to the conduct 
of prosecutors and defense lawyers for each county. 
While these changes are an important step towards progress, more is required in connection 
with disciplining errant prosecutors and increasing transparency.  The State Bar’s reasons for 
closing investigations where courts reported misconduct should be made public, and the Bar’s 
annual discipline report should include more specific numbers as to how many prosecutors 
and criminal defense attorneys were investigated and received discipline.206  The State Bar must 
also address the problem of multiple offenders, by directing any criminal justice attorney found 
to have committed misconduct more than once to take an ethics class specifically designed to 
address ethical issues that occur in criminal cases.  
  
Conclusion
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Conclusion
“Our criminal justice system depends on the integrity of the attorneys who present 
their cases to the jury.  When even a single conviction is obtained through perjurious or 
deceptive means, the entire foundation of our system of justice is weakened.”
  – Hayes v. Brown, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 207
Our criminal justice system aims at a difficult and critical balance.  The requirement that 
prosecutors only use fair means of conviction means that they sometimes are unable to convict 
people they believe are guilty.  But that is the balance we have struck, recognizing that it is 
better that some guilty go free than the fairness of trials be compromised and the innocent 
convicted.  
The Misconduct Study demonstrates that the system is failing to achieve this balance.  Those 
charged with ensuring it—the courts, prosecutors, and the State Bar—are not fulfilling their 
obligations to monitor, report and discipline prosecutorial misconduct.  It is difficult to 
imagine a stronger wake-up call than the Misconduct Study’s finding that out of 707 cases of 
court-identified misconduct, only six prosecutors were disciplined.  
The authors have made specific recommendations for dealing with the problem.  But the real 
remedies lie with the public, which must recognize the severity and importance of the problem 
and keep pressure on those responsible until reform occurs.  The terrible consequences of 
prosecutorial misconduct for innocent defendants, taxpayers, crime victims and the entire 
criminal justice system mandate action.  
The time for change and professional accountability is now. 
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Singh, 142 F.3d 1157 (1998)
San Diego
Anzalone, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 689 (2005)
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Yolo
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Carter, 2001 WL 32068 (2000)
Caruto, 2008 WL 2440558 (2008)
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Geston, 299 F.3d 1130 (2002)
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Leon-Gonzalez, 2001 WL 1485876 (2001)
Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149 (2006)
Robledo-Vela, 2002 WL 1941166 (2002)
Shaver, 607 F.Supp.2d 1168 (2009)
Velarde-Gomez, 2001 WL 1262610 (2001)
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Butte
Cooper, 2004 WL 407156 (2004)
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Rogers, 2003 WL 21101820 (2003)
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Smithey, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 (1999)
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Bland, 2006 WL 217968 (2006)
Bryden, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (1998)
Hilton, 2006 WL 1125233 (2006)
Levine, 2003 WL 21541274 (2003)
McCaffery, 1999 WL 1097989 (1999)
Payton, 2003 WL 22040421 (2003)
Pratcher, 2009 WL 2332183 (2009)
Ramirez F, 2009 WL 1027554 (2009)
Sutton, 2003 WL 932524 (2003)
Young, 1997 WL 557972 (1997)
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Del Norte
Stephens-Miner, 2003 WL 1958850  
  (2003)
El Dorado
Caico, 2006 WL 3191135 (2006)
Coddington, 23 Cal.4th 529 (2000)
Cox, 30 Cal. 4th 916 (2003)
Fresno
Anderson 2005 WL 356838 (2005)
Calderon, 2006 WL 306920 (2006)
Contreras, 2004 WL 1303654 (2004)
Fanady, 2007 WL 155179 (2007)
Flores F, 2002 WL 66151 (2002)
Garcia, 2005 WL 1941341 (2005)
Jacome, 2005 WL 1189036 (2005)
Johnson E, 2007 WL 1247062 (2007)
Kephart, 2006 WL 2000035 (2006)
Lor, 2002 WL 31320348 (2002) 
McCombs, 2002 WL 31097693 (2002)
Ortiz, 2005 WL 3471784 (2005)
Phaphonh, 2005 WL 3494952 (2005
Humboldt
Evers, 2001 WL 3095769 (2001)
Holland, 2005 WL 1799429 (2005)
Leon, 2002 WL 1880747 (2002)
Imperial
Foster, 2006 WL 3412538 (2006)
Kern
Barboza, 2003 WL 21310573 (2003)
Flores, 2007 WL 852864 (2007)
Garza, 2003 WL 21641496 (2003)
Gibson, 2006 WL 1163270 (2006)
Lopez, 2003 WL 22683400 (2003)
Lucas, 2002 WL 1473114 (2002)
Quiroga, 2009 WL 3034319 (2009)
Siler, 2006 WL 3759526 (2006)
Welch, 2006 WL 401694 (2006)
Williams, 2006 WL 3802620 (2006)
Williams, 2007 WL 1653054 (2007)
Kings
Baday, 2004 WL 49715 (2004)
Bowen, 2005 WL 775752 (2005)
Serna, 2004 WL 759248 (2004)
Lake
Boone, 2009 WL 190999 (2009)
Los Angeles
Aguilar, 2004 WL 170625 (2004)
Aguilar, 2001 WL 1530898 (2001)
Aguilar, 2006 WL 2556927 (2006)
Ahumada, 2006 WL 2349170 (2006)
Alfaro, 2005 WL 1077575 (2005)
Amadi, 2004 WL 119401 (2004)
Anderson, 2003 WL 21995454 (2003)
Anderson, 2005 WL 2496839 (2005)
Anderson, 2008 WL 241088 (2008)
Archer, 2004 WL 103354 (2004)
Arcila, 2003 WL 194948 (2003)
Baker, 2002 WL 3176409 (2002)
Bautista, 2005 WL 1744414 (2005)
Beaghan, 2004 WL 1558467 (2004)
Belden, 2002 WL 90992 (2002)
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Belei, 99 Fed.Appx. 813(2004)
Beltran, U.S. Dist. Case No.  
  CV 01-3404-GAF (2004)
Benavente, 2009 WL 5067615 (2009)
Benn, 2006 WL 2382918 (2006)
Bodnar, 2004 WL 1172980 (2004)
Bowles, 2007 WL 1203711 (2007)
Braddock, 2001 WL 1566430 (2001)
Brown, 2009 WL 2170487 (2009)
Broyles 2003 WL 1984557 (2003)
Buckhalter, 2008 WL 224366 (2008)
Caballero, 2008 WL 1778068 (2008)
Cabrera, 2009 WL 4809884 (2009)
Cantabrana, 2006 WL 3423267 (2006)
Carlsen, 2008 WL 217881 (2008)
Caro, 2008 WL 62531 (2008)
Carrier, 2004 WL 1447754 (2004)
Castro, 2005 WL 2387463 (2005)
Cruzata, 2003 WL 22093914 (2003) 
Duran, 2001 WL 1656607 (2001)
Earp, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 (1999)
Eckman, 2009 WL 1277733 (2009)
Edwards, 2007 WL 2028863 (2007)
Espinoza, 2008 WL 315785 (2008)
Estrada, 2002 WL 1883373 (2002)
Faltisco, 2004 WL 1798067 (2004)
Fields, 309 F.3d 1095 (2002)
Fisher, 2003 WL 1875136 (2003)
Flores, 2006 WL 414815 (2006)
Flores, 2008 WL 852822 (2008)
Flowers, 2001 WL 1154634 (2001)
Friendly, 2004 WL 1558793 (2004)
Frierson, 2006 WL 2637658 (2006)
Garcia, 2003 WL 1958431 (2003)
Garcia, 2004 WL 1682775 (2004)
Garcia, 2006 WL 1828016 (2006)
Gautt, 2003 WL 25600060 (2003)
Gonzales, 2007 WL 2247423 (2007)
Gonzales, 2007 WL 586635 (2007)
Gonzalez, 2006 WL 1314029 (2006)
Gonzalez, 2006 WL 711100 (2006)
Graham, 2009 WL 2623331 (2009)
Grandy, Appellate Case No. B186687  
   (2006)
Greenwood, 2004 WL 473643 (2004)
Grizzelle, 2005 WL 1763621 (2005)
Gutierrez, 2005 WL 1524666 (2005)
Guzman, 2002 WL 1904426 (2002)
Hagenno, 2001 WL 1486786 (2001)
Hamilton, 2003 WL 22079585 (2003)
Harris, 2004 WL 1879894 (2004)
Hernandez M, 2002 WL 1375998 (2002)
Higuera, 2005 WL 3073354 (2005)
Hinton, 37 Cal.4th 839 (2006)
Holguin, 2006 WL 760718 (2006)
Howell, 2002 WL 596477 (2002)
Hutson, 2002 WL 397724 (2002)
Jacobs, 2004 WL 1842553 (2004)
Jaramillo, 2006 WL 178628 (2006)
Jefferson, 2005 WL 1971274 (2005)
Jelks, 2003 WL 21949145 (2003)
Johnson, 2009 WL 3166649 (2009)
Johnson S, 109 Cal.App.4th 1230 (2003)
Jones, 2005 WL 2822410 (2005)
Jones, 2007 WL 4410377 (2007)
Jones, 2009 WL 2037382 (2009)
Kipp, 26 Cal.4th 1100 (2001)
Lampel, 2002 WL 31087844 (2002)
Laney, 2007 WL 178436 (2007)
Larsen, 2002 WL 31873618 (2002)
Leichman, 2005 WL 1017926 (2005)
Lewis A, 2003 WL 147772 (2003)
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